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I WANNA DESIGN FOR SOMEBODY  
(WHO NEEDS ME): THE INTERSECTION  
OF HUMANITARIAN ENGINEERING, 
CHOICE-OF-LAW, AND TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER IN KENYA 
Abstract: A significant technology gap exists between developed and devel-
oping countries. Though developing countries have started to self-innovate, 
they do not possess adequate means to fulfill their right to develop, which the 
UN recognizes as an essential human right. For developing countries to exer-
cise this right, developed countries must transfer technology. Humanitarian 
engineers have confronted this challenge without any international guidance 
or regulation, as no uniform system for international technology transfer 
agreements exists. To remedy this inadequacy, scholars have proposed the 
characteristic approach, which suggests that the contents of the contract, ra-
ther than the parties’ locations, should control the choice of law. This pro-
posal, however, fails to consider unintended, harmful consequences on devel-
oping countries. This Note analyzes the characteristic approach through a case 
study of humanitarian engineers in Kenya, a country held back by a lack of in-
frastructure while standing on the cusp of innovation. The characteristic ap-
proach does not present a viable solution for Kenya because it favors the law 
of developed countries too often. Instead, technology transfer agreements 
should stipulate that the developing country’s law should govern the agree-
ment. Further, when this results in an insurmountable burden on the transferor, 
a developed country’s law should only control if the contract adheres to the 
policies of Africa’s regional economic communities. In the case of humanitar-
ian engineers, academic institutions and international organizations focused 
on humanitarian engineering have an ethical burden to enforce this standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
Kenya, like many developing countries, faces a technology gap.1 For 
example, the United States granted 303,049 patents in 2016.2 In the same 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Kaitlyn Ellison, Note, Rio+20: How the Tension Between Developing and Developed Coun-
tries Influenced Sustainable Development Efforts, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 
107, 122–23 (2014) (acknowledging that many developing countries do not have the resources 
necessary for development, such as the capital needed to sustain infrastructure, while developed 
countries do); see, e.g., Abdikadir Ismail, How Can Developing Countries Close the Digital Di-
vide?, BRIT. COUNCIL (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.britishcouncil.org/voices-magazine/how-can-
developing-countries-close-digital-divide [https://perma.cc/T3TW-FVX4] (explaining how one 
rural town in Kenya lacked teachers who knew how to operate a digital lockbox, whereas urban 
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year, Kenya approved twenty-six.3 Furthermore, the United States has over 
1,650,000 professional engineers, comprising around 0.5% of the U.S. pop-
ulation.4 Kenya has approximately 10,300, comprising about 0.002% of its 
population.5 The American engineers likely graduated from one of over 485 
American universities with accredited engineering programs.6 Kenya has 
only nine similar institutions.7 Not only does a technology gap exist be-
                                                                                                                           
Kenyan schools complete almost all homework online). Significant controversy surrounds the defi-
nition of a “developing country.” See Tim Fernholz, The World Bank Is Eliminating the Term “De-
veloping Country” from Its Data Vocabulary, QUARTZ (May 17, 2016), https://qz.com/685626/
the-world-bank-is-eliminating-the-term-developing-country-from-its-data-vocabulary [https://perma.
cc/A6FZ-7F9Y] (commenting that the lack of a definitive definition for “developing countries” 
has led the World Bank to stop using the term); Tariq Khokhar & Umar Serajuddin, Should We 
Continue to Use the Term “Developing World”?, THE WORLD BANK: DATA BLOG (Nov. 16, 
2015), http://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/should-we-continue-use-term-developing-world [https://
perma.cc/5PUH-C2BN] (analyzing data presented by multiple international organization to rec-
ommend against using the term “developing countries”). This Note uses the definition set forth by 
the International Monetary Fund, as it includes the greatest number of economic factors without 
allowing countries to self-designate. See IMF, Subdued Demand Symptoms and Remedies, World 
Economic Outlook, 203–04 (Oct. 2016) (explaining the multitude of factors used when consider-
ing classifying a country as a developing nation). 
 2 World Intellectual Prop. Org. (WIPO), World Intellectual Property Indicators 2017, at 27 
(2017), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/96FB-
C36E] (summarizing the number of intellectual property filings in 2016 for each country). The 
United States Patent and Trademark Office also examined 932,786 patent applications in 2016, 
granting about fifty percent of patents to U.S. residents. Id. at 27, 94. Furthermore, half of all pa-
tent applications filed by non-residents in Australia, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and Turkey came 
from U.S. residents. Id. at 34. 
 3 Id. at 27. Of the twenty-six patents, only five came from Kenyan residents. Id. at 92. 
 4 See United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, World Population Prospects: The 2017 
Revision, U.N. Doc. POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2017/POP/F01-1 (2017) (providing an estimate of the 
2015 United States population); Occupational Employment Statistics Query for Engineers in the 
United States, U.S. DEP’T LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/oes/#/home (select one 
occupation for multiple industries; narrow the industry sector to engineers; choose all sectors in 
this list; then select all industries in this list) (listing the number of U.S. engineers). 
 5 See World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, supra note 4 (providing an estimate of 
the 2015 Kenyan population); Challenges Facing Engineering in Kenya, KENYA ENGINEER (Aug. 
17, 2017), https://www.kenyaengineer.co.ke/challenges-facing-engineering-in-kenya-2 [https://
perma.cc/WAJ4-JURW] (stating the number of engineers registered with the Engineers Board of 
Kenya, a necessary membership to practice engineering in Kenya). Of the 10,300 engineers in 
Kenya, 2,000 practice as professional engineers and 8,300 have graduated with an engineering 
degree without receiving a professional certification. Id. 
 6 ABET Accredited Engineering Programs, ACCREDITATION BOARD FOR ENG’G & TECH., 
http://main.abet.org/aps/AccreditedProgramSearch.aspx (search “Engineering” under Program 
Name; select “All programs containing the term(s): ‘Engineering’”; ensure search is for “bachelor 
(4-year)” degrees in the United States) (listing all accredited U.S. engineering programs). 
 7 Approved Engineering Programs, ENGINEERS BOARD OF KENYA, https://ebk.or.ke/accredited-
engineering-programs [https://perma.cc/97XL-F44B] (listing the universities with accredited en-
gineering programs in Kenya). 
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tween developing and developed countries, but developing countries do not 
have the resources to start accessing or creating new advancements.8 
Kenya, however, has started to innovate.9 Nairobi hosts an array of 
companies focused on the country’s modernization, dubbing the area as the 
“Silicon Savannah.”10 The technology center iHub, for example, has 
launched over 170 start-up companies since 2010.11 This revolution in Ken-
ya has brought new technology to the nation, but innovators still face 
strong, uncontrollable barriers.12 Factors such as limited access to clean wa-
ter, improper sanitation, and gender inequality limit the effectiveness of 
technology incubators.13 As a result of the social inequities and infrastruc-
ture deficiencies that Kenyans experience, the country cannot achieve the 
social, political, and economic standards of living enjoyed by developed 
countries.14 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Ellison, supra note 1, at 122–23; see, e.g., Ismail, supra note 1 (detailing the difference in 
education between rural and urban Kenya); see also G.A. Res. 66/288, annex, The Future We 
Want, paras. 48, 58(i) (Sept. 11, 2012) (arguing for sustainable economic growth through bridging 
the gap between developed and developing countries). 
 9 Jeremy de Beer et al., A Framework for Assessing Technology Hubs in Africa, 6 N.Y.U. J. 
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 237, 239–40 (2017) (quoting Mark Zuckerberg’s claim that “the future 
will be built in Africa” due to the rise in technology hubs); Bitange Ndemo, How Kenya Became 
the Cradle of Africa’s Technological Innovation, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 27, 2016), https://www.news
week.com/how-kenya-became-cradle-africas-ict-innovation-534694 [https://perma.cc/6J8U-Z8ZX] 
(describing how Kenya’s economy has seen a surge in technology incubators). 
 10 Abdi Latif Dahir, Kenya’s Newest Tech Hubs Are Sprouting Outside Its “Silicon Savan-
nah” in Nairobi, QUARTZ AFR. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://qz.com/1059305/kenyas-newest-tech-
hubs-are-sprouting-outside-its-silicon-savannah-in-nairobi [https://perma.cc/V8EN-6M2W] (ex-
plaining the innovation that has stemmed from work in Nairobi). 
 11 Id. See generally IHUB, https://ihub.co.ke [https://perma.cc/4Q65-K3RA] (detailing the 
business and ideals of iHub). 
 12 See, e.g., Homes for Africa’s Tech Entrepreneurs, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://
www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21646216-tech-hubs-are-expanding-fast-across-
africa-homes-africas-tech-entrepreneurs [https://perma.cc/7LK6-W5KV] (noting how African inno-
vators still battle power outages, inconsistent internet, and expensive rent prices for office space). 
 13 See Food & Agric. Org., The Community Land Rights of Women and Youth in Tana River 
and Turkana Counties, U.N. Doc. 17074EN/1/05.17 (noting that women only own 5% of land in 
rural Kenya); Elijah Bisung & Susan J. Elliott, Improvement in Access to Safe Water, Household 
Water Insecurity, and Time Savings: A Cross-Sectional Retrospective Study in Kenya, SOC. SCI. & 
MED., Mar. 2018, at 1, 6 (finding that only a quarter of individuals surveyed collected water from 
sanitary locations); Sheillah Simiyu et al., Determinants of Quality of Shared Sanitation Facilities 
in Informal Settlements: Case Study of Kisumu, Kenya, BMC PUB. HEALTH, Jan. 11 2017, at 2 
(concluding that 65 percent of residents in Kisumu, Kenya do not have proper sanitation). 
 14 See, e.g., Susan Wyche & Charles Steinfield, Why Don’t Farmers Use Cell Phones to Ac-
cess Market Prices? Technology Affordances and Barriers to Market Information Services Adop-
tion in Rural Kenya, 22 INFO. TECH. FOR DEV. 320, 327 (2016) (determining that factors such as 
the poor condition of phones, the risk of text messages not sending, and limitations on access to 
power decreased farmers’ use of cell phones); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, arts. 13, 17, 25, 28, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights] (stating the fundamental rights guaranteed to each individual). 
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To curb the effects of the technology gap, humanitarian engineers have 
significantly increased their efforts in developed countries.15 Humanitarian 
engineers focus on adapting typical design principles to assist the develop-
ment of impoverished regions.16 In academia, universities educate students 
on the impact of humanitarian engineering on social justice and develop-
ment.17 Additionally, investors now see the economic benefit of placing 
products into developing countries’ markets.18 Companies attempting to 
profit from developing nations do so by rethinking their design processes to 
create products that are sustainable in extremely impoverished communi-
ties.19 
The companies, however, still need to transfer the physical technology, 
technical knowhow, and intellectual property rights to the developing na-
tion.20 A developed nation can transfer technology to a developing nation 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Syed Imran Ali, Engineering in Solidarity: Hybridizing Knowledge Systems in Humanitar-
ian and International Development Work, PROCEDIA ENG’G, Dec. 2015, at 11, 11 (explaining the 
recent growth in humanitarian engineering); see, e.g., Mission & History, ENG’RS WITHOUT BOR-
DERS USA, https://www.ewb-usa.org/about-us/mission-and-history [https://perma.cc/DYX4-
HXMF] (stating the mission of Engineers Without Borders); see also Christopher A. Mattson & 
Amy E. Wood, Nine Principles for Design for the Developing World as Derived from the Engi-
neering Literature, J. MECHANICAL DESIGN, Dec. 2014, at 1, 1 (reporting that the membership of 
Engineers Without Border increased by 500% between 2005 and 2011). 
 16 Humanitarian Engineering, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (May 29, 2016), https://www.britannica.
com/topic/humanitarian-engineering [https://perma.cc/5XR3-3PJM]. 
 17 Ali, supra note 15, at 13; see, e.g., David LaPorte et al., Engineering to Help Communities 
or Students’ Development? An Ethnographic Case Study of an Engineering-to-Help Student Or-
ganization, INT’L J. FOR SERV. LEARNING IN ENGINEERING, HUMANITARIAN ENGINEERING & 
SOC. ENTREPRENEURSHIP, Fall 2017, at 103, 105 (presenting a case study on a student organiza-
tion focused on designing “sustainable engineering projects” in developing nations); Engineering 
for Community Development Minor, COLO. SCH. MINES (2018), https://humanitarian.mines.
edu/ecd-minor [https://perma.cc/RT5H-XW8G] (offering the first humanitarian engineering mi-
nor). But see Social, Behavioral, and Economic Science Research: Oversight of the Need for Fed-
eral Investments and Priorities for Funding: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Research and Sci. 
Educ. of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 112th Cong. 34 (2011) (statement of Dr. Peter 
W. Wood, President, National Association of Scholars) (advocating for the federal government to 
end federal funding of humanitarian engineering programs as these programs divert resources 
from scientific research). 
 18 Mattson & Wood, supra note 15, at 1 (explaining that developing nations’ markets repre-
sent a multi-trillion-dollar opportunity); see, e.g., Robin Podmore et al., Fueling Sustainability: 
The Exponential Impact of Empowering Off-Grid Communities, IEEE ELECTRIFICATION MAG., 
Mar. 2016, at 11, 11–12 (detailing the IEEE Smart Village initiative that trains and organizes 
individuals in developing nations’ rural areas on successful business techniques). 
 19 See Amy E. Wood & Christopher A. Mattson, Design for the Developing World: Common 
Pitfalls and How to Avoid Them, J. MECHANICAL DESIGN, Mar. 2016, at 1, 2 (providing back-
ground on humanitarian engineers, their motives, and potential areas for reform by studying failed 
Engineers Without Borders projects and finding that common design pitfalls, include lacking 
cultural competence, focusing exclusively on short-term gains, and overestimating personal abili-
ties, are responsible for the failure of many projects). 
 20 See Hans Henrik Lidgard et al., Framing the Issue, in SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGY TRANS-
FER 1, 6–7 (Hans Henrik Lidgard et al. eds., 2012) (stating the humanitarian need to transfer tech-
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through research collaborations, economic initiatives, licensing agreements, 
and collaborative production of goods.21 In order for an engineer to profit 
from a transaction, the jurisdiction into which the engineer transfers the 
technology must recognize and protect the engineer’s intellectual property 
rights.22 The engineer’s need for protection presents concerns for engineers 
in developed nations because innovators in developing countries could ex-
ploit the technology that the engineers designed.23 Without the protection of 
intellectual property laws, engineers may be unable to profit from their con-
cepts.24 Currently, humanitarian engineers must decide if they are willing to 
enter a multi-trillion-dollar market unprotected.25 If these engineers do try 
to protect their intellectual property rights, they must choose whether to 
avail themselves of their countries’ laws or the local laws in developing 
countries like Kenya.26 For instance, engineers who allow Kenyan law to 
control may face strong political corruption, inaccessible legal standards, 
and lackluster enforcement of their intellectual property rights.27 If those 
                                                                                                                           
nology); see also, Hannibal Travis, WIPO and the American Constitution: Thoughts on a New 
Treaty Relating to Actors and Musicians, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 45, 47 (2013) (showing 
how the World Intellectual Property Organization serves a dual role of transferring technology 
between developed and developing countries as well as increasing the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights). Technology transfer generally refers to the exchange of money, goods, or ser-
vices or limited exchange of rights for the ability exploit intellectual property. Technology Trans-
fer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 21 See Zhong Fa Ma, The Effectiveness of Kyoto Protocol and the Legal Institution for Inter-
national Technology Transfer, 37 J. TECH. TRANSFER 75, 87 (2012) (listing potential forms of 
technology transfer). 
 22 See TU THANH NGUYEN, COMPETITION LAW, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 25 (2010) (noting that technology transfer is only successful when both jurisdictions 
protect the intellectual property related to the transferred technology). 
 23 See LTC HARMS, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CASE-
BOOK 13 (3d ed. 2012) (explaining the relationship between domestic and foreign intellectual 
property protections); see, e.g., Beechman Group PLC v. Triomed (PTY) Ltd. 2002 (4) All SA 193 
(SCA) at para. 7 (S. Afr.) (denying the extension of a United Kingdom patent into South Africa 
due to each country’s differing intellectual property policies). 
 24 See HARMS, supra note 23, at 13 (explaining how ownership of intellectual property rights 
can allow the holder to exploit the underlying property); NGUYEN, supra note 22, at 25 (arguing 
that both countries in an international technology transfer agreement must recognize the intellec-
tual property rights to the technology for economically successful technology transfer to occur). 
This Note does not cover the non-economic topics of intellectual property, such as compulsory 
licensing. See infra notes 40–293 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Mattson & Wood, supra note 15, at 1 (outlining considerations important to engineers 
when designing a product for the developing world). 
 26 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: 
The Demise of Territoriality, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 718 (2009) (detailing ambiguous 
provisions in international treaties that allow for the right to choose a contract’s governing law). 
 27 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS 
INDEX 2016, at 7 (2017) https://webforms.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Transparency-
International-Corruption-Perceptions-Index-2016/$FILE/EY-Transparency-International-Corruption-
Perceptions-Index-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX85-C78U] (ranking Kenya as 145 of 176 on the 
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engineers do not select Kenyan law as governing the interpretation of tech-
nology transfer agreements, they may prevent Kenyans from realizing their 
right to development.28 
This Note analyzes how humanitarian engineers should choose the law 
that governs their technology transfer agreements.29 Part I begins by de-
scribing the history of the right to development and the standards for inter-
national and Kenyan intellectual property rights, with Kenyan law serving 
as a case study representing the current state of law in developing coun-
tries.30 Part I further describes an emerging trend in which contracting par-
ties select a preferred jurisdiction based on the terms of a contract rather 
than the location of the signers.31 Part II discusses the potential effects of 
choosing the law of a developed nation or the law of Kenya on Kenya’s 
right to development.32 Part II also considers the necessary influence of Af-
rica’s regional economic communities.33 Part III proposes a solution for en-
gineers grappling with a decision that balances a product’s economic prof-
its, a nation’s right to develop, and the engineers’ personal interests when 
choosing a governing jurisdiction.34 Part III then proposes a means of im-
plementing and enforcing this decision-making process on an international 
scale.35 
This Note argues that an engineer transferring technology to Kenya 
must favor Kenyan law.36 An engineer should only choose a developed 
country’s laws when the transfer includes three or more countries.37 In these 
situations, the terms of the contract should adhere to the policies of Africa’s 
regional economic communities.38 To implement this standard, international 
                                                                                                                           
Corruption Perceptions Index); William Ouko et al., Characteristics of Magistrates’ Courts That 
Impede Access to Justice Within Nairobi County, 5 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. RES. 153, 154, 156 (2015) 
(detailing how the Kenyan courts have not updated their technological system); see also infra notes 
173–205 and accompanying text (detailing corruption in Kenya). 
 28 See G.A. Res. 41/128, annex, Declaration on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986) 
[hereinafter Declaration on the Right to Development] (stating that each nation has a right to sci-
entific and social progress determined by the public policy of that country); see also infra notes 
173–205 and accompanying text (explaining the benefits of selecting Kenyan law to control tech-
nology transfer agreements). 
 29 See infra notes 40–293 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 40–121 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 122–164 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 165–239 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 232–239 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 240–280 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 281–293 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 240–293 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 268–280 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 268–280 and accompanying text. 
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organizations and universities focused on humanitarian engineering should 
educate their members on and require compliance with this system.39 
I. HOW TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER STARTED WITH HUMAN  
RIGHTS, CREATED DISHARMONY ON AN INTERNATIONAL  
LEVEL, AND IMPACTED AN IDEAL CASE STUDY 
International intellectual property standards have shifted significantly 
in recent decades.40 The growth of international regulation and enforcement 
has directly influenced developing countries’ ability to access technology.41 
Given that the changes often favor developed countries, developing coun-
tries may be forced to choose between development and maintaining their 
cultural heritage.42 This Part explains why international bodies now consid-
er the use of technology a human right and how that definition has led to 
modern standards for technology transfer between developed and develop-
ing countries.43 Section A highlights how international bodies have facilitat-
ed an increased number of technology transfers by deeming the use of sci-
entific improvements a fundamental right.44 Section B explains recent de-
velopments in international intellectual property law since the enactment of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) 
and the current international standards governing those rights.45 Section C 
discusses how Kenya, a developing nation, has adapted and created its 
technology transfer laws.46 Section D describes the uncertainty surrounding 
choice-of-law provisions in international licensing agreements and de-
                                                                                                                           
 39 See infra notes 281–293 and accompanying text. 
 40 Emir Aly Crowne, Fishing TRIPS: A Look at the History of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, 2 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 77, 92–93 (2011) 
(detailing the mandates and history of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (“TRIPS”)); see Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (updating international intellectual 
property laws to create minimum protection requirement for all signatory countries). 
 41 Matthew Turk, Note, Bargaining and Intellectual Property Treaties: The Case for a Pro-
Development Interpretation of TRIPS but Not TRIPS Plus, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 981, 
1004–05 (2010) (explaining that TRIPS Plus provisions are provisions through which developed 
countries use trade agreements as leverage to mandate changes to developing countries’ national 
policy, typically requiring protection significantly stricter than the minimum mandate set in 
TRIPS). 
 42 Lois Muraguri et al., IPRs, Agriculture and Food Security, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN KENYA 39, 45–46 (Moni Wekesa & Ben Sihanya eds., 2009) (explaining the im-
portance of communal intellectual property rights in rural communities). 
 43 See infra notes 48–164 and accompanying text. 
 44 See infra notes 48–73 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 74–107 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 108–121 and accompanying text. 
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scribes a proposed reform for selecting the controlling jurisdiction when 
disputes arise.47 
A. Declaring the Right to Development as a Human Right 
The international community recognizes that human beings have fun-
damental rights, such as the right to migrate freely, the right to retain prop-
erty, and the right to social peace.48 After the atrocities of the Second World 
War, the international community sought to create a standard to uphold 
these ideals.49 By signing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
United Nations (U.N.) member states forged a multinational agreement to 
protect human rights in a unified effort for the first time in history.50 The 
idea of human rights expanded in 1976 to include the right to use advanced 
discoveries and technologies.51 In a final advancement, the U.N. added the 
right to development to the definition of human rights in 1986.52 The U.N. 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See infra notes 122–164 and accompanying text. 
 48 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14, arts. 13, 17, 25, 28 (stating that 
every individual has certain rights guaranteed at birth which no government or individual can 
abridge and which member states have an interest in protecting); see also Human Rights, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining human rights as certain fundamental protections and 
privileges that every human obtains as a member of their society). 
 49 Tai-Heng Cheng, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at Sixty: Is It Still Right for 
the United States?, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 259 (2008) (explaining the influence of Hitler’s 
Germany on the creation Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Many countries, however, had 
to carefully craft their arguments and demands when negotiating the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights because of their overseas territories. Id. at 260. 
 50 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 14, pmbl.; Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent 
History of Human Rights, 109 AM. HIST. REV. 117, 117 (2004) (claiming that no multinational 
push for human rights existed prior to the 1940s). Contra Christopher N.J. Roberts, Grasping at 
Origins: Shifting the Conversation in the Historical Study of Human Rights, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
573, 574, 575 n.1 (2017) (explaining that scholars debate whether the origin of human rights starts 
with ancient texts, colonialism, or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). 
 51 See G.A. Res. 3384 (XXX), Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Pro-
gress in the Interests of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind, paras. 1, 6 (Nov. 10, 1975) [herein-
after Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress] (acknowledging access to 
technology as a human right); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15(1)(b) (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (ac-
knowledging individuals’ right to benefit from technological advancements); see also G.A. Res. 
44/133, para. 1 (Dec. 15, 1989) (upholding the Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Techno-
logical Progress). 
 52 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 28, art. 1(1); see World Conference 
on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993) (reaffirming the right to development); Organization of African 
Unity, African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, arts. 
20(1), 22 (June 27, 1981) (adopting a resolution that defined human rights to include the right to 
development for the first time in history). The Declaration on the Right to Development did not 
come without controversy, however, as many scholars claimed that the right to development is an 
economic right rather than a fundamental right. SIOBHÁN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD & HANS-OTTO 
SANO, HUMAN RIGHTS INDICATORS IN DEVELOPMENT 10 (2010) (summarizing critiques against 
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defined the right to development as a government’s affirmative duty to en-
sure access to “basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, 
employment and the fair distribution of wealth” regardless of gender.53 
The U.N., along with other international bodies, has included devel-
opment as a human right for three primary reasons: prevention of abuse, 
opportunities for growth, and preservation of life.54 The imbalance between 
socially and economically dominant and subordinate communities can lead 
to a controlling group overpowering subordinate individuals by utilizing 
technology only accessible to the ruling group.55 If a minority community 
cannot access a technology, that community lacks the capacity to develop.56 
For example, in a recent landmark case by the African Commission on Hu-
man and People’s Rights in 2010, the Commission ruled that the Kenyan 
government could not evict a local community of people to create a land 
reserve because doing so would violate the people’s right to development 
by depriving them of property.57 Though Kenya would greatly benefit from 
                                                                                                                           
including the right to development within the definition of human rights); Arjun K. Sengupta, 
Conceptualizing the Right to Development for the Twenty-First Century, in REALIZING THE RIGHT 
TO DEVELOPMENT 67, 74 (2013) (explaining why human rights should not include economic 
rights, such as the collective right to development). 
 53 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 28, art. 8(1). 
 54 Id. pmbl.; see, e.g., WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF 
THE WORLD BANK 2–3 (1998) (stating the World Bank’s understanding of its influence on the 
right to development within the meaning of human rights); Stephen Kim Park, Talking the Talk 
and Walking the Walk: Reviving Global Trade and Development After Doha, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 
365, 384–85 (2013) (showing how the high cost of antiretroviral medicine prolonged the effects of 
the AIDS epidemic in developing countries by making the drugs inaccessible). 
 55 See, e.g., David Arnold, Europe, Technology, and Colonialism in the 20th Century, HIST. 
& TECH., Mar. 2005, at 85, 91–92 (noting how European countries used technologies such as mass 
transportation and medical advancements to control African and Asian nations by employing these 
technologies to heighten class divisions between those who could and could not access the ad-
vancements); see also Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 28, pmbl. (expressing 
concerns about repeating previous abuses of human rights, such as apartheid and colonialism). 
Many colonizing powers implemented an education system that focused on reading and writing 
skills that emphasized typically Western professions, such as working as clerks and interpreters. 
See Stephen Ocheni & Basil C. Nwankwo, Analysis of Colonialism and Its Impact in Africa, 
CROSS-CULTURAL COMM., Aug. 2012, at 46, 47, 51 (highlighting the long-term impacts of British 
colonialism on Kenya). As a result, many African communities abandoned their education sys-
tems, lost traditional knowledge, and relied on colonial powers to employ individuals. Id. 
 56 Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress, supra note 51, pmbl.; see, 
e.g., Muhammed Miah & Adnan Omar, Technology Advancement in Developing Countries Dur-
ing Digital Age, INT’L J. SCI. & APPLIED INFO. TECH., Mar.–Apr. 2012, at 30, 32 (describing how 
digital technology can improve literacy in developing countries by diversifying educational re-
sources); see also Amir Dossal, Exec. Dir., U.N. Fund for Int’l Partnerships, Secretary-General’s 
Message to “The Net World Order: Bridging the Global Digital Divide” Conference Hosted by the 
Business Council for the United Nations (June 18, 2003) (urging high-technology companies in 
the United States to consider the impacts of communication technology on developing countries). 
 57 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International 
on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, Communication 276/03, African Commission on 
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the increase in tourism associated with advertising a land reserve previously 
owned by the Endorois people, the Commission placed the rights of indi-
viduals ahead of the state’s interest based on the belief that development is a 
human right that a government cannot infringe for the purposes of econom-
ic development.58 In addition to the social and economic benefits, access to 
technology can help curb natural disasters by allowing countries to use ad-
vanced technology to battle emergencies such as wildfires and disease out-
breaks.59 
Intellectual property rights arguably fall under the right to develop-
ment because having enforceable protections incentivizes the growth in and 
transfer of technology to developing countries.60 Even with the potential for 
growth, intellectual property rights can reduce creativity and economic 
growth when the rights become too restrictive.61 For example, when intel-
lectual property standards protect a broader range of ideas and works, inves-
tors become less likely to supply resources to a country for fear of infring-
ing on locally-owned intellectual property.62 If, however, intellectual prop-
erty laws do not provide enough protections, designers leave their products 
                                                                                                                           
Human and Peoples’ Rights [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], para. 17, recommendations para. 1 (Feb. 4, 
2010), http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/comunications/276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2DRA-U58D] (holding that the Kenyan government cannot seize land from the 
Endorois people around Lake Bogoria); see also Kenya: Landmark Ruling on Indigenous Land 
Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 4, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/04/kenya-
landmark-ruling-indigenous-land-rights [https://perma.cc/QYN6-BFLF] (explaining how the 
Commission’s ruling favored the indigenous people by upholding the community’s property rights 
over Kenya’s desire to convert a nature reserve to a tourist destination). 
 58 Kenya: Landmark Ruling on Indigenous Land Rights, supra note 57; see Centre for Minori-
ty Rights Development, Afr. Comm’n H.P.R., para. 228 (sustaining the arguments brought by the 
claimant against the Kenyan government). 
 59 See WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND 
INNOVATION: INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND 
TRADE 116 (2012) (noting how a lack of access to medical research permits treatable diseases to 
propagate in developing countries); Stephen Humphreys, Perspective: Technology Transfer and 
Human Rights: Joining Up the Dots, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2009, at 2, 2 (argu-
ing that developing countries can only mitigate the effects of climate change if they have access to 
advanced technologies). 
 60 Compare IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY AND GROWTH 11 (2011) (stating that intellectual property rights can limit a region’s creativ-
ity by establishing monopolies that limit designers’ potential design techniques), with Tu Thanh 
Nguyen, Technology Transfer and Competition Law: Options for Developing Countries, in SUS-
TAINABLE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 20, at 65, 69 (claiming that once intellectual 
property rights become too monopolistic, anti-competition law will encourage growth). 
 61 HARGREAVES, supra note 60, at 11; see Nguyen, supra note 60, at 68 (noting that the un-
derlying purpose of intellectual property laws—to increase novel and inventive technologies—
remains constrained by the effects of exclusive tendencies). 
 62 Brett M. Neve, Note, China, Google, and the Intersection of Competition and Intellectual 
Property, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1091, 1107 (2013) (arguing that domestic law must 
balance becoming overly restrictive and preventing designers from realizing a return on invest-
ment with becoming overly broad and incentivizing forgery). 
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open to counterfeiting by operating in a jurisdiction.63 The tension between 
overly restrictive and overly permissive intellectual property rights can 
cause disparities between how different nations consider and grant intellec-
tual property rights.64 Due to the potential for both growth and harm result-
ing from intellectual property regulation, countries must balance their inter-
nal policies so that they do not violate other nation’s right to develop while 
still guaranteeing adequate legal protection to individuals.65 
In an effort to help guide countries and further individual nations’ right 
to develop, the U.N. passed the Millennium Development Goals in 2000.66 
The Goals aimed to eliminate underdevelopment, defend against curable 
illnesses, and prevent unhealthy living environments.67 By the target date in 
2015, however, the U.N. had not fulfilled all of its goals.68 For example, 
during the fifteen years that the Goals remained in force, developing coun-
tries experienced increased access to information and communication tech-
nology, but this access often did not improve standards of living.69 Access 
to this technology benefits a community by connecting people to greater 
amounts of information and limits the potential impact of natural disasters, 
such as widespread famine.70 These benefits alone, however, did not result 
                                                                                                                           
 63 NGUYEN, supra note 22, at 24; see, e.g., John Mwazemba, How Book Piracy Can Negatively 
Affect the Lives of Children in Kenya, DAILY NATION (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.nation.co.ke/
lifestyle/weekend/Book-piracy-negatively-affect-lives-of-children-in-Kenya/1220-3890196-cfdy
82z/index.html [https://perma.cc/2EET-D2BL] (detailing how counterfeit textbooks in Kenya 
have left schools without sustainable and complete educational resources because the under-
market-price text books often lacked proper binding, failed to indicate which version the seller 
printed, or contained ink that quickly deteriorated). 
 64 See, e.g., Ryann Beck, Farmers’ Rights and Open Source Licensing, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 168, 176 (2011) (illustrating how the divergence in plant patenting regulations in domes-
tic intellectual property rights laws has established a system where developed countries tend to 
allow for extensive patent protection of plants, while developing countries typically have next-to-
no patenting rights applicable to plants). 
 65 See Neve, supra note 62, at 1107 (comparing the benefits and drawbacks of strict intellec-
tual property laws). 
 66 MILLENNIUM DEV. GOAL GAP TASK FORCE, TAKING STOCK OF THE GLOBAL PARTNER-
SHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT: MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, at 6 (2015) [hereinafter MDG 
GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015] (detailing the background and purpose of the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals); see also Lidgard et al., Framing the Issue, supra note 20, at 5 (stating the Goals’ 
purpose). See generally G.A. Res. 55/2, United Nations Millennium Declaration (Sept. 18, 2000) 
(reaffirming the U.N. commitment to support underdeveloped countries through a unified, interna-
tional effort). 
 67 MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, supra note 66, at xi. 
 68 Id. at 1–2. 
 69 THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2015, at 6 (Catharine Way ed., 2015) 
(noting the increased access to mobile phones and internet worldwide by over 900% and 700%, 
respectfully). In addition, the cost of internet access in developing countries decreased by almost 
500% between 2008 and 2015. MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, supra note 66, at 70. 
 70 MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, supra note 66, at 73; see, e.g., Sendai Framework 
for Disaster and Risk Reduction 2015–2030, A/CONF.224/CRP.1, para. 17 (Mar. 18, 2015) 
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in complete success for the Goals because of access discrepancies in rural 
areas.71 For example, during natural disasters, some emergency notification 
systems prioritize notifying individuals with a higher likelihood of survival 
first, leaving behind the communities facing the greatest danger.72 Although 
the international community recognizes the right to development and has 
taken active steps to support it, many developing countries still do not have 
access to the technology necessary to fully realize this right.73 
B. The Current Minimum Standard for Enforcing  
Intellectual Property Rights 
On January 1, 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) enacted the 
TRIPS agreement, which sought to establish a universal system for enforc-
ing intellectual property rights.74 Up until this point, developing and devel-
oped countries had not successfully negotiated a baseline requirement for 
these rights.75 Previous international agreements had only considered the 
                                                                                                                           
(demonstrating the need to include advanced science to curb the effects felt by natural catastro-
phes). 
 71 MDG GAP TASK FORCE REPORT 2015, supra note 66, at 68. 
 72 Id. at 73. 
 73 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 28, art. 1(1); see, e.g., Jacob Poushter, 
Smartphone Ownership and Internet Usage Continues to Climb in Emerging Economies, PEW RE-
SEARCH CTR. 3 (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/02/
pew_research_center_global_technology_report_final_february_22__2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6645-VRU6] (highlighting the discrepancy in access to the internet between developed and developing 
countries); see also Upendra D. Acharya, Symposium, Globalization and Hegemony Shift: Are States Mere-
ly Agents of Corporate Capitalism?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 937, 952 (2013) (arguing that countries now support 
the right to development primarily through the transfer of goods and monetary support). 
 74 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, pmbl. (mandating an international minimum stand-
ard for intellectual property rights); see also Susy Frankel, WTO Application of “the Customary 
Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law” to Intellectual Property, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
365, 379 (2006) (stating that the motivation behind TRIPS stemmed from inadequate administra-
tion of intellectual property rights outside of independent domestic spheres). TRIPS resulted from 
an international collaboration, the Uruguay Round negotiations, that sought to create a universal 
standard for all aspects of trade. Crowne, supra note 40, at 79; see Understanding the WTO: The 
Uruguay Rounds, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
fact5_e.htm [https://perma.cc/UAD6-LLA8] (providing background on the Uruguay Rounds). The 
Rounds included discussions related to intellectual property after the United States encouraged 
developed countries to consider the impact of trade-related aspects of intellectual property. 
Crowne, supra note 40, at 80–81. 
 75 Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 
979, 980 (2009) (stating that TRIPS created minimum requirements for domestic intellectual 
property laws). The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, for example, set 
forth an international standard for registering trademarks. Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property art. 1, Mar. 20, 1888, 13 U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at Stock-
holm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 (detailing the re-
quired standard for trademark protection for signatory members). Unlike TRIPS, though, the Paris 
Convention did not mandate compliance through a judicial body. See Thu-Lang Tran-Wasescha & 
Xavier Groussot, TRIPS Article 66.2: Between Hard Law and Soft Law?, in SUSTAINABLE TECH-
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needs of developed or developing countries but had never addressed both 
simultaneously.76 This landmark agreement gave developing nations a say 
on what they wanted from the international community.77 Thus, the push 
from developing nations to create a uniform system for intellectual property 
rights became a motivating factor to start the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions.78 
The developed and developing nations overcame opposing needs to 
harmonize international intellectual property laws during the Uruguay 
Round due to one main influence: trade.79 The Uruguay Rounds presented a 
unique opportunity for negotiations, as the initiative resulted from individu-
al countries’ interests rather than an international organization’s mandate.80 
The negotiations, however, pitted the developing countries against the de-
veloped countries.81 The developed nations, led by the United States, ex-
pressed a growing concern for the ineffectiveness of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO).82 In addition, the United States feared an 
outcome that allowed developing nations to gain too much economic pow-
er.83 On the other hand, developing nations wanted more negotiating power 
but still needed technology that the developed nations possessed.84 Fueled 
by the strong need to resolve these tensions, the Uruguay Round established 
the WTO and enacted TRIPS by the Round’s conclusion in 1995.85 
                                                                                                                           
NOLOGY TRANSFER, supra note 20, at 13, 19 (showing how agreements prior to the establishment 
of the WTO lacked a legally enforceable mandate). A lack of international enforcement led to the 
failure of the Paris Agreement. See id. (explaining the importance of the WTO’s adjudication 
system). 
 76 Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 66 AM. U. L. 
REV. 829, 839 (2017) (detailing the history of attempts to reform international technology transfer 
agreement standards). 
 77 Crowne, supra note 40, at 80; see, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 31 (allowing 
for compulsory licensing, a negotiated provisions that strongly benefits developing countries). 
 78 Crowne, supra note 40, at 79. 
 79 Id. (explaining how developed countries’ fears about developing nations ignoring the de-
veloped countries’ intellectual property rights motivated them to negotiate, and explaining that the 
developed countries used technology that developing nations needed as leverage against develop-
ing nations). 
 80 Id. at 79–80. 
 81 Id. at 79. 
 82 Id. at 79–80. 
 83 See id. (explaining that the United States did not want to lose its negotiating power in inter-
national bodies through non-participation in the Uruguay Rounds); see also Sam F. Halabi, Inter-
national Intellectual Property Shelters, 90 TUL. L. REV. 903, 913–14 (2016) (noting how histori-
cal attempts by the United States to increase the protections under intellectual property laws often 
contradicted the views and practices of other international bodies). 
 84 Crowne, supra note 40, at 79–80; Yu, supra note 76, at 840. 
 85 Park, supra note 54, at 380; see Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization art. IV(5), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (creating the Council for TRIPS that 
oversees the enforcement of TRIPS). 
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Upon signing the agreement, all current and future members of the 
WTO became legally bound to its provisions.86 TRIPS mandated minimum 
safeguards for intellectual property rights.87 More specifically, TRIPS set 
forth compliance standards for copyrights, trademarks, geographic indica-
tors, industrial designs, patents, integrated circuit designs, trade secrets, and 
monopolistic licensing attempts.88 Through these provisions, the WTO es-
tablished an international policy for protecting intellectual property rights.89 
The enforcement of TRIPS and the required updates to signatories’ na-
tional law resulted in a controversial outcome for developing countries.90 
For example, TRIPS’s mandate to establish a baseline standard for intellec-
tual property rights required developing nations to create domestic adjudi-
cators focused on these protections.91 This meant that developing nations 
had to formulate a set of laws and enforcement mechanisms that might con-
tradict how their cultures viewed property.92 Furthermore, though develop-
ing countries negotiated certain provisions that provided them with a greater 
sense of security from the dominance of developed nations, TRIPS still cre-
ated barriers for developing countries seeking to utilize these clauses.93 For 
example, Article 31 of TRIPS allows non-licensed individuals to use anoth-
er’s intellectual property rights without permission during times of emer-
gency.94 The individual, however, can only do so if he or she meets the 
twelve requirements necessary to obtain a compulsory license.95 Provisions 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Tran-Wasescha & Groussot, supra note 75, at 19; see, e.g., Request for Consultations by 
Brazil, United States—US Patents Code, WTO Doc. WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001) (requesting the 
WTO to determine if 35 U.S.C. § 18 complies with the TRIPS Agreement). 
 87 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, art 7. 
 88 Id. arts. 9–40 (outlining specific mandates for the enumerated categories); see Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting 
TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 280 (1997) (analyzing how 
TRIPS set forth a protective policy for intellectual property rights as compared to previous agree-
ments). See generally Technology and Intellectual Property, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE 
WTO 347, 349–50 (Bernard Hoekman et al. eds., 2002) (summarizing the main provisions of 
TRIPS). 
 89 Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Separation of Powers in Intellectual Property Rights: Balancing 
Global Intellectual Property Rights or Monopoly Power in the Twenty-First Century by Competi-
tion Law, 26 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2013) (summarizing the international legal impact of 
TRIPS). 
 90 Halabi, supra note 83, at 915. 
 91 Patricia L. Judd, Towards a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 613, 621–22 (2011) (ex-
plaining the influence of TRIPS on individual countries’ intellectual property policies). 
 92 See Muraguri et al., supra note 42, at 45–46 (contrasting how Western views of intellectual 
property rights allow individuals who hold property rights to economically exploit those rights, 
while developing countries typically disseminate technical know-how freely throughout a com-
munity). 
 93 Halabi, supra note 83, at 917. 
 94 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 31. 
 95 Id. art. 31(k). The requirements include oversight from a governmental body—the same 
bodies mandated by the developed countries—to ensure compliance with TRIPS’s principles. Id. 
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such as Article 31 grant developing nations the ability to act in their best 
interest but still bind those nations to the property ideals and legal proce-
dures promoted by developed countries.96 
The international community has attempted to update TRIPS and miti-
gate the negative effects felt by developing nations.97 For example, in its 
yearly meeting in 2001, the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration, and mem-
ber states later enacted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health (“Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement”).98 The Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement focuses on the relationship between TRIPS, public 
health, and compulsory licensing.99 This declaration symbolized a meeting 
of the minds between developed and developing nations but did little with 
respect to changing or enforcing international agreements because many 
countries saw the agreement as non-binding.100 
Even with the developed countries’ renewed commitment to public 
health, as shown by Article 7 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, 
many developed countries continue to restrict TRIPS provisions aimed at 
assisting developing countries.101 Developed countries have created so-
called “TRIPS Plus” agreements that require developing nations to enact a 
heightened level of intellectual property protections in exchange for favora-
ble trade agreements between two countries.102 These provisions typically 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Halabi, supra note 83, at 917; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 31 (explaining the 
process for acquiring a compulsory license, which includes oversight by an approved adjudicator). 
 97 J. Janewa OseiTutu, Human Development as a Core Objective of Global Intellectual Prop-
erty, 105 KY. L.J. 1, 29–30 (2016) (explaining the meaning of the Doha Declaration); see, e.g., 
Turk, supra note 41, at 1005 (commenting on how TRIPS Plus agreements eliminate the adaptable 
provisions built into TRIPS for developing countries). 
 98 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14 
November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 [hereinafter Declaration on the TRIPS Agree-
ment] (presenting the WTO’s renewed commitment to promote international trade, as originally 
established in the Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO); World Trade Organization, 
Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 99 OseiTutu, supra note 97, at 29–30. See generally Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 98, para. 5 (acknowledging the use and need for compulsory licenses); Doha Declara-
tion, supra note 98, para. 19 (recognizing a need to reevaluate the scope of TRIPS with respect to 
public health). 
 100 See Turk, supra note 41, at 987, 989 n.33 (noting that the failure of the Doha Declaration 
resulted from lacking legal mandates); see also Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 98, 
para. 7 (reaffirming the developed countries’ commitment to assist with the developing nations’ 
progress). 
 101 Turk, supra note 41, at 1004; see, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., supra note 59, at 55 
(outlining the process in which developed nations force higher standards on developing nations 
through mandatory provisions in trade agreements). See generally Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 98 (upholding the developed nations’ dedication to increase access to 
technology for developing countries). 
 102 Turk, supra note 41, at 1004; see, e.g., Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade 
Area, para. 5, Jordan-U.S., Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan Trade Agreement] 
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require developing countries to either form a more inclusive intellectual 
property rights standard or reinterpret the country’s understanding of the 
TRIPS provisions.103 For example, in a 2000 treaty between Jordan and the 
United States, the two countries established a free trade area on the condi-
tion that Jordan complied with the United States’ mandatory intellectual 
property law updates.104 Both TRIPS and the Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement allow for TRIPS Plus agreements by permitting member states 
to determine the best method for protecting intellectual property rights.105 
Developed countries interpret this flexibility to permit TRIPS Plus agree-
ments.106 These practices require developing countries to comply with de-
veloped countries’ systems and minimize aspects of TRIPS that favor de-
veloping nations.107 
C. Case Study: How Kenya Has Quickly Adapted to a Mandated 
International Minimum for Intellectual Property Rights 
TRIPS further complicated Kenya’s longstanding tension with intellec-
tual property rights.108 Kenya’s intellectual property laws trace their devel-
opment to colonialism.109 After the British Empire colonized Kenya in 
1920, Kenya had to comply with the British legal system.110 Even though 
Kenya gained its independence in 1963, Kenya remained completely de-
pendent on the British intellectual property system until 1989.111 In 1989, 
Kenya ratified the Industrial Property Act (1989) and formed the Kenya 
                                                                                                                           
(requiring Jordan to eliminate the patentability of mathematical formulae to create a free-trade 
agreement between Jordan and the United States). 
 103 Turk, supra note 41, at 1004–05. 
 104 U.S.-Jordan Trade Agreement, supra note 102, para. 5. 
 105 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 98, para. 4; TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 40, art. 1(1); see WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., supra note 59, at 55 (describing how TRIPS 
allows TRIPS Plus agreements because TRIPS only mandates a minimum standard). 
 106 Turk, supra note 41, at 1004. 
 107 Crowne, supra note 40, at 96; Turk, supra note 41, at 1005. 
 108 Moni Wekesa, An Overview of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) Regime in Kenya, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN KENYA, supra note 42, at 7. 
 109 Crowne, supra note 40, at 77; see Eugene Cotran, The Development and Reform of the 
Law in Kenya, 27 J. AFR. L. 42, 42 (1983) (stating that British law controlled the Kenyan colony 
after the enactment of the East Africa Order in Council 1897). 
 110 Cotran, supra note 109, at 42. 
 111 Wekesa, supra note 108, at 7; see Maurice N. Amutabi, Political Interference in the Run-
ning of Education in Post-Independence Kenya: A Critical Retrospection, INT’L J. EDU. DEV., 
Mar. 2003, at 127, 128 (stating Kenya’s independence year). See generally The Industrial Property 
Act (1989, repealed 2001) Cap. 509 § 3(1) (Kenya) (establishing an independent Kenyan law 
regulating intellectual property). Kenya granted its first patent in 1932 while under the British 
system. George M. Sikoyo et al., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN AFRICA 1, 18 (Judy 
W. Wakhungu ed., 2006). 
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Industrial Property Office (“KIPO”), a body controlled solely by the Ken-
yan government.112 
Later, as a WTO founding member state, Kenya again updated its laws 
to comply with the new TRIPS regulations.113 Kenya accomplished this by 
ratifying the Industrial Property Act (2001).114 The major revisions included 
removing seeds from patentability, implementing a patent system for indus-
trial designs, and reforming KIPO to the Kenya Industrial Property Institute, 
among other standardizing practices.115 
Another major development was Kenya’s adoption of a new constitu-
tion in 2010.116 Kenya’s previous constitution did not mention intellectual 
property or the protection of intangible rights.117 The new constitution, 
however, references intellectual property multiple times and includes intel-
lectual property in the definition of property and as a means to protect cul-
ture.118 Though the inclusion of intellectual property in the 2010 constitu-
tion caused some concern, the addition of these clauses represented a histor-
ic shift in Kenya’s view of intellectual property.119 Kenya’s definition of 
intellectual property changed from a community-based necessity to a pri-
                                                                                                                           
 112 The Industrial Property Act (1989, repealed 2001) Cap. 509 § 3 (Kenya) (creating the 
Kenya Industrial Property Office that served to establish intellectual property rights; validate tech-
nology transfer contracts; educate Kenyans on intellectual property rights; and advance research 
and scientific progress in Kenya). 
 113 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1(1) (requiring member states to reform nation-
al law to comply with TRIPS); Kenya and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/countries_e/kenya_e.htm [https://perma.cc/QXF9-3GU9] (identifying Kenya as 
a member of the WTO since Jan. 1, 1995). 
 114 The Industrial Property Act (2001) Cap. 510 § 121(1) (changing Kenya’s intellectual 
property laws to comply with the standards set forth in TRIPS). 
 115 Sikoyo et al., supra note 111, at 42; Wekesa, supra note 108, at 7–9. See generally The 
Industrial Property Act (2001) Cap. 510 § 3 (establishing the Kenyan Industrial Property Insti-
tute). The Industrial Tribunal at Nairobi in Pfizer Inc. v. Cosmos Ltd. in 2006 ruled that patents 
granted with the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization must comply with Kenyan 
law, thus cementing the Industrial Property Act’s jurisdiction. Wekesa, supra note 108, at 7. 
 116 CONSTITUTION arts. 263–264 (2010) (Kenya); see Kenya President Ratifies New Constitu-
tion, BBC (Aug. 27, 2010), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-11106558 [https://perma.cc/
6XCC-VYJP] (commenting on how the new constitution resulted from twenty years of negotia-
tions). 
 117 See generally CONSTITUTION (1969, amend. 1997) (Kenya) (stating Kenya’s overall legal 
policies prior to 2010). 
 118 CONSTITUTION arts. 11(1), 11(2)(e), 260 (2010) (Kenya). 
 119 Victor Nzomo, Constitutional Protection of Intellectual Property in Kenya, IP KENYA 
(Jan. 9, 2011), https://ipkenya.wordpress.com/2011/01/09/constitutional-protection-of-intellectual-
property-in-kenya [https://perma.cc/272G-TBSZ] (explaining the change in policy that occurred as 
a result of the inclusion of intellectual property rights in the new Kenyan constitution); Edwin 
Sudi, New Dawn for Intellectual Property in Kenya, STANDARD DIGITAL (Oct. 19, 2010), https://
www.standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000020629/new-dawn-for-intellectual-property-in-
kenya [https://perma.cc/CB4A-TU8J] (acknowledging the potential benefit of including intellec-
tual property in the constitution and questioning if Kenya would benefit from the changes). 
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vately-held, exploitable idea.120 By passing legislation like the Industrial 
Property Act 2001 and adopting its new constitution, Kenya has reformed 
its national law to fit the theory of property underlying Western intellectual 
property rights.121 
D. Removing the Uncertainty: A Proposal for a Uniform Choice-of-Law 
Standard Based on Contract Considerations 
The lack of a uniform technology transfer standard has caused interna-
tional confusion.122 Policy think tanks and academics, however, have started 
to propose solutions to this unpredictable system.123 Subsection 1 explores 
how the complexity of intellectual property agreements cannot easily con-
form to typical choice-of-law analyses.124 Subsection 2 discusses a proposed 
standardized, international system to determine governing law in technology 
transfer disputes.125 
1. The Complexity of International Technology Transfer Agreements 
Currently, no international standard for technology transfer contracts 
exists.126 The U.N. previously attempted to mitigate differences in technol-
                                                                                                                           
 120 Sudi, supra note 119; see, e.g., Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectu-
al Property Regimes: A Reappraisal of the Tensions Between Individual and Communal Rights in 
Africa and the United States, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 769, 779 (1999) (discussing how Kenyans com-
monly rely on traditional knowledge, a type of intellectual property, to sustain knowledge neces-
sary for survival through multiple generations). 
 121 Wekesa, supra note 108, at 10; see Muraguri et al., supra note 42, at 44–45 (reasoning 
how intellectual property rights root in Western understandings of property law); Justin Hughes, 
The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 365 (1988) (claiming that the origins of 
intellectual property originate with either Lockean or Hegelian philosophies). 
 122 Paul Torremans, Cross-Border Licensing in the Absence of a Choice of Law: Is There a Way 
Forward?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRADE 25, 27 (Jan Rosén ed., 
2012) (proposing a new system for determining a controlling jurisdiction in international technology 
transfer agreements); Jacques de Werra, The Need to Harmonize Intellectual Property Licensing 
Law: A European Perspective, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRADE, supra, 
at 90, 91 (highlighting the lack of international law controlling cross-border intellectual property 
agreements). 
 123 E.g., EUROPEAN MAX PLANCK GRP. ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPER-
TY, PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY pmbl. (2011) [hereinafter 
PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY] (proposing a new standard for 
determining governing law in international technology transfer agreements); de Werra, supra note 
122, at 91 (suggesting a reform for the European Union’s consideration of intellectual property 
contracts). The Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property presents a uniform system 
for how to create and interpret choice-of-law clauses in intellectual property transactions. PRINCI-
PLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra, pmbl. 
 124 See infra notes 126–151 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 152–164 and accompanying text. 
 126 Torremans, supra note 122, at 27; see de Werra, supra note 122, at 91 (advocating for 
international reform based on the lack of universal processes for technology transfer agreements). 
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ogy access between developed and developing nations in the 1970s and 
1980s during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.127 
The conference proposed the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer 
of Technology, which attempted to create a uniform standard for technology 
transfer.128 If adopted, the Code of Conduct would have set forth a strong 
obligation for U.N. member states to comply with a universal technology 
transfer system.129 The agreement failed, however, due to the tension be-
tween developed and developing nations.130 During the negotiations, devel-
oping countries sought additional economic power, but the developed coun-
tries did not want to lose their international control.131 
The lack of an international standard has forced parties to individually 
negotiate each technology transfer agreement.132 These negotiations must 
balance the parties’ interests in cost, access to the technology, and mutual 
economic benefits.133 Statutes controlling contract law, however, may re-
strict these interests.134 For example, international and domestic contract 
law have a well-established system for determining the law governing a 
contract: either the stipulated jurisdiction or, in the absence of a chosen ju-
risdiction, the court-chosen jurisdiction.135 If the parties do not select a con-
                                                                                                                           
 127 Nguyen, supra note 60, at 70. 
 128 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Draft International Code of Conduct on the 
Transfer of Technology, Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat to the U.N. Conference on an Interna-
tional Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, Ch. 2.1, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/47 
(1985) (proposing an international standard for cross-border technology transfer agreements). 
 129 Id. ch. 3.1; Nguyen, supra note 60, at 70 (explaining how the Code forbid signatory coun-
tries from implementing fourteen licensing techniques). 
 130 Nguyen, supra note 60, at 70; cf. Yu, supra note 76, at 841–42 (noting the positions taken 
by the developed and developing countries during the TRIPS negotiations). 
 131 Nguyen, supra note 60, at 70; Yu, supra note 76, at 841–42. 
 132 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 27 (explaining the complexity of technology transfer 
agreements). 
 133 See David M. Driesen, Contract Law’s Inefficiency, 67 SYRACUSE U. COLLEGE L. FAC-
ULTY SCHOLARSHIP, Summer 2012, at 1, 1 (stating an overarching contract policy of minimizing 
transaction costs); Lars Meyer, Soft Law for Solid Contracts? A Comparative Analysis of the Val-
ue of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of 
European Contract Law to the Process of Contract Law Harmonization, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 119, 122–23 (2006) (advocating for uniform contract standards to decrease confusion be-
tween parties). 
 134 Nguyen, supra note 60, at 66; see Emile Loza de Siles, Intellectual Property Licensing: 
More Pervasive Than You Might Imagine, THE ADVOCATE, June 2005, at 18, 18 (2005) (reason-
ing that questions arising from intellectual property rights must consider contract law). 
 135 E.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations arts. 3(1), 4(1), 1980 
O.J. (L 266) [hereinafter Rome Convention] (allowing contracting parties to choose a controlling 
jurisdiction and stipulating a rule in the absence of the parties’ choice); U.C.C. § 1-301(a)-(b) 
(AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (permitting parties to designate and determine control-
ling law by showing that the chosen jurisdiction has a reasonable relationship to either party or to 
the jurisdiction where the transaction occurs). 
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trolling jurisdiction, litigation costs will increase and contract law precedent 
and policy will dictate which laws control.136 
Intellectual property agreements add to the complexity of negotiations 
because intellectual property rights vary by jurisdiction.137 Even when par-
ties stipulate a jurisdiction, that jurisdiction may not have the ability to pre-
side over a matter because the jurisdiction may not recognize the right.138 In 
addition, intellectual property rights constantly change as national and in-
ternational tribunals interpret intellectual property statutes.139 This process 
increases in complexity with international contracts because of differing 
systems of law, such as Kenyan law, which derives from common, tribal, 
and Islamic law.140 
As an example of how choice-of-law creates international uncertainty, 
in 2015 the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)141 in Philip Morris Asia 
Ltd. v. Australia, ruled that Australia, rather than the PCA, had jurisdiction 
over a matter concerning the potential violation of a treaty between Austral-
ia and Hong Kong.142 In 2011, Australia passed the Tobacco Plain Packag-
ing Act 2011, which required tobacco companies to package and sell prod-
ucts that comply with decorative restrictions, such as no artistic borders or 
colored adhesives.143 The claimant then sued the Australian government in 
                                                                                                                           
 136 John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH. L. REV. 
631, 632–33 (2017) (detailing the fundamental aspects of and policies for choice-of-law clauses); 
see, e.g., Rome Convention, supra note 135, arts. 3(1), 4(1) (setting forth a process to determine 
governing law based on party’s intent); U.C.C. § 1-301(a)-(b) (applying a reasonable-relationship 
examination to determine the applicable law). 
 137 See Peter Picht, Collateralizing IP Licenses: Present Deficiencies and Proposals for Reform, 
41 AIPLA Q.J. 423, 460 (2013) (explaining the territorial variability of intellectual property protec-
tions). 
 138 Id. (explaining that the nation that granted an intellectual property right maintains jurisdic-
tion over matters concerning that right because only that tribunal has recognized the right). 
 139 See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014) (disallowing 
the patenting of claimant’s invention and thus significantly heightening the standard for patenting 
computer software). 
 140 See Tom Ojienda & Leonard Obura Aloo, Researching Kenyan Law, GLOBALEX, http://
www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Kenya.html [https://perma.cc/5L5M-SNTE] (discussing the 
background of Kenya’s legal system). 
 141 See generally 1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I) 
arts. 20, 21, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779 (establishing the PCA). The PCA, founded in 1899 and 
resurrected in 1991, focuses on resolving international conflicts inappropriate for national tribunals. 
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement, 5, 7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/EDM/
Misc.232/Add.26 (2003) (detailing the purpose and goals of the PCA). The PCA resolves conflicts 
through arbitration rather than litigation. Id. at 7. 
 142 See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, PCA 
Case No. 2012-12, paras. 585, 588 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) (dismissing a claim for arbitration due to 
a lack of jurisdiction and thus allowing litigation to presume in Australia). 
 143 See Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) s 3, 18 (Austl.) (establishing minimum re-
quirements for packaging tobacco in Australia); see also Christopher Knaus, Philip Morris Ciga-
rettes Charged Millions After Losing Plain Packaging Case Against Australia, THE GUARDIAN (July 
2018] Choice-of-Law, Technology Transfer, and Developing Countries 3003 
the PCA for violating the claimant’s intellectual property rights, which were 
protected and outlined by a 1993 treaty.144 In order for the PCA to have ju-
risdiction over the matter, the tribunal recognized that a claimant must show 
both ratione temporis and no abuse of rights.145 First, the PCA had ratione 
temporis jurisdiction because the claimant’s investment occurred before 
Australia passed the Tobacco Packaging Act.146 The PCA determined, how-
ever, that the claimant abused its rights under the treaty because the claim-
ant knew Australia would pass the Plain Packaging Act 2011 before the 
claimant restructured their corporation.147 As such, Australia retained proper 
jurisdiction.148 
Although the Philip Morris Asia ruling shows an international tribu-
nal’s willingness to give jurisdiction to a sovereign state, tribunals have not 
been consistent in this regard.149 For example, in Philip Morris Brands 
SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID) held that it had jurisdiction over a 
lawsuit relating to a copyright issue in a treaty between Switzerland and 
                                                                                                                           
9, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/10/philip-morris-cigarettes-charged-
millions-after-losing-plain-packaging-case-against-australia [https://perma.cc/P7KR-V72J] (explain-
ing how the Plain Packaging Act 2011 applied stricter standards to cigarette packaging than the laws 
of many other nations). 
 144 Philip Morris Asia, Award on Jurisdiction, PCA Case No. 2012-12 para. 183. See general-
ly Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K., art. 1(e)(iv), Sept. 15, 
1993, 1748 U.N.T.S. 385 (defining investment to include the rights guaranteed through intellectu-
al property protections). 
 145 Philip Morris Asia, Award on Jurisdiction, PCA Case No. 2012-12 para. 527; see Renée 
Rose Levy & Gremcitel S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/17, Award, para. 182 
(Jan. 9, 2015) (explaining the difference between a ratione temporis and abuse of right assertion 
as requiring a ratione temporis claim to precede an abuse of right objection). Ratione temporis 
requires a court to have jurisdiction over a matter when the matter occurred. Jurisdiction, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining jurisdiction ratione temporis as a require-
ment for a court to have jurisdiction over a claim when the events occurred for the court to hear 
the matter). 
 146 Philip Morris Asia, Award on Jurisdiction, PCA Case No. 2012-12 para. 533. 
 147 Id. para. 569. 
 148 Id. para. 588. The PCA later required the claimant to pay respondent’s legal fees, showing 
how uncertainty can increase the cost of enforcing an agreement. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. 
Australia, Final Award Regarding Costs, PCA Case No. 2012-12, para. 105 (Mar. 8, 2017) (re-
quiring the claimant to pay a specified, redacted percentage of the respondent’s legal fees); see 
also Knaus, supra note 143 (claiming that the respondent’s legal expenses to be paid by Philip 
Morris could be around $50 million AUD). 
 149 Compare Philip Morris Asia, Award on Jurisdiction, PCA Case No. 2012-12 para. 588 
(finding that the PCA lacked jurisdiction over a matter stemming from a treaty between Australia 
and Hong Kong), with Philip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 236 (July 2, 2013) (finding jurisdiction over a mat-
ter regarding a treaty dispute between Switzerland and Uruguay). 
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Uruguay.150 Though both cases resulted from a similar claim, fact pattern, 
and alleged violation, an international tribunal only found jurisdiction in 
one case, demonstrating the unpredictability in this area.151 
2. A Proposed Reform: The Characteristic Test 
As a result of outcomes like Philip Morris Asia and an overall lack of 
uniformity, scholars have called for reform in international technology 
transfer agreements to increase certainty when contracting.152 An emerging 
trend calls for an analysis of the terms of the contract, referred to as the 
characteristic test.153 First, under the characteristic test, the parties may 
stipulate a controlling jurisdiction.154 A court can, however, disregard such 
stipulations if they are not explicit.155 If a contract does not stipulate a juris-
diction, the court must determine which set of laws applies based on the 
agreement’s characteristics.156 
In the absence of a choice-of-law stipulation, a court utilizing the char-
acteristic test must start by considering both parties’ intents and then deter-
mine the jurisdiction with the closest relationship to the contract.157 This 
results in an analysis based on the terms binding the licensee and licensor 
individually.158 The location of the party with the higher burden imposed by 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Philip Morris Brands SÀRL, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 paras. 235, 236 (permitting juris-
diction over a matter brought by the claimant because hearing the matter in a national tribunal 
would lead to useless litigation). 
 151 Compare Philip Morris Asia, Award on Jurisdiction, PCA Case No. 2012-12 para. 588 
(declining to find jurisdiction based on a foreseeability issue under an abuse of rights doctrine), 
with Philip Morris Brands SÀRL, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 para. 236 (finding jurisdiction in a 
matter because of the potential for unnecessary litigation in Uruguayan courts). 
 152 E.g., PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, 
pmbl. (calling for international reform with regards to the standards for cross-border technology 
transfer agreements); de Werra, supra note 122, at 91 (suggesting that the European Union reform 
the standard for intellectual property contracts). 
 153 PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, arts. 
3:501–:502; see Torremans, supra note 122, at 36–37 (expressing support for the principles pro-
posed by the European Max Planck Group in PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY); cf. Picht, supra note 137, at 426 (arguing that licensing agreements should 
mirror secured transactions regulations to decrease inefficiencies). 
 154 PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:501(1). 
 155 See id. (mandating that parties explicitly state the chosen jurisdiction). 
 156 Torremans, supra note 122, at 35. 
 157 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(1)-(2) (presenting the analysis to determine what governing law should control the con-
tract). Through this type of analysis, the established jurisdiction choice is based on a consideration 
of the protected subject matter’s role rather than purely on the parties’ location. See id. art. 
3:502(2) (detailing the process for determining the governing law in the absence of an explicit 
clause). 
 158 Id. art. 3:502(2). 
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the contract will determine the governing law.159 If a court cannot easily 
determine a jurisdiction through these considerations and the license con-
cerns use in a single state, then the state where the licensed product goes 
into use will control the dispute.160 If the license permits use in multiple 
states, the court will apply the law of the place where the transferor resides 
at the signing of the agreement.161 
This test breaks from the standard practice of focusing solely on the par-
ties’ locations.162 The characteristic test offers a uniform standard under 
which parties will know which authority will control a contract dispute, with 
the potential exception of multi-state licensing agreements.163 Even with 
these benefits, the test does not directly consider how choice of jurisdiction 
negatively affects developing nations, even though use of the test may in-
crease technology transfer.164 
II. HOW CHOICE-OF-LAW IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER  
CONTRACTS IMPACTS KENYA 
Jurisdictions have consistently recognized the right of parties to stipu-
late a controlling jurisdiction in contracts.165 In order to choose the appro-
priate law, however, the contracting parties must understand the potential 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. art. 3:501(3). 
 161 Id. art. 3:501(2). The Principles on the Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property does not 
clarify the means to establish the location of the licensor. See id. But cf. U.C.C. § 9-307 (AM. L. 
INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (providing a method for determining the legal location of a debt-
or in a secured transaction). 
 162 Compare Rome Convention, supra note 135, art. 4(2) (stipulating that for contracts with-
out a choice-of-law clause, the location of the signer who obtains an obligation to act will dictate 
the controlling law unless the contract considers immovable property), and Burnham v. Superior 
Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (upholding the U.S. standard of granting jurisdiction 
based on a party’s physical existence in a jurisdiction), with PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 3:502(1)-(2) (focusing on the terms presented 
in the contract rather than the residence of either party). 
 163 Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (explaining how the enactment of the European Max 
Planck Group’s principles will increase efficiency and confidence in licensing transactions). 
 164 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, 
pmbl. (omitting a reference to the impact on developing countries); see also Torremans, supra 
note 122, at 35 (explaining how the enactment of the European Max Planck Group’s principles 
will increase efficiency and confidence in licensing, but not discussing the impacts on developing 
nations). 
 165 E.g., HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, PRINCIPLES ON CHOICE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art. 2(1) (2015) (detailing how a court should inter-
pret a choice-of-law provision or lack thereof); U.C.C. § 1-301(a)-(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. 
COMM’N 2017) (stating the process for determining the controlling legal authority); see also 
Coyle, supra note 136, at 632–33 (illustrating how the use of choice-of-law agreements resulted 
from unnecessary and costly litigation determining which set of laws should apply). 
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impact of precedent and regulations in that jurisdiction.166 If an engineer 
wants to transfer technology to Kenya, for example, the contract must 
choose a jurisdiction or leave a costly dispute over governance to the courts, 
which will only focus on the parties’ location.167 As a result of the agree-
ments, Kenya may either benefit from the internal development of its intel-
lectual property law or face undue influence from developed countries’ le-
gal systems and philosophies.168 This Part addresses this concern.169 Section 
A discusses the benefits of hosting disputes in Kenya.170 Section B analyzes 
the impacts of foreign countries overseeing controversies regarding tech-
nology transfer agreements.171 Section C seeks to resolve potential conflicts 
that engineers will face by proposing a solution focused on Africa’s regional 
economic communities.172 
A. The Case for Kenya Hosting Technology Transfer Disputes 
The characteristic-based approach favors the transferee’s jurisdiction 
as a result of two main factors: profit and burden.173 When considering prof-
it, the test assumes that only one country will economically benefit from the 
technology as a result of the transferee’s executing the rights granted under 
the agreement.174 The test recognizes that a transferor, as a removed party, 
should not control disputes arising from the contract because the controver-
sies would stem from actions in only the transferee’s jurisdiction.175 This 
analysis, however, does not consider whether the affected location would 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Coyle, supra note 136, at 633. In many cases, however, parties do not conduct proper due 
diligence in researching the chosen jurisdiction’s laws. Id. at 633–34. 
 167 Id. at 632–33. 
 168 See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
481, 495–96 (2011) (outlining how the liberal admission of lawsuits in American courts has led to 
an increase in international dispute settlements in U.S. jurisdictions); see also infra notes 173–239 
and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of engineers selecting Kenyan law to govern tech-
nology transfer agreements). 
 169 See infra notes 173–239 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 173–205 and accompanying text. 
 171 See infra notes 206–231 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 232–239 and accompanying text. 
 173 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(2)(a) (detailing the factors required to determine the controlling authority by examining the 
agreement’s characteristics). 
 174 See id. (favoring the transferee’s country because the profit results from the work of the 
transferee rather than a less-involved transferor). 
 175 See id. (listing factors favoring the transferee); see, e.g., Kristen Elisabeth Bollinger, Note, 
A New Hope for Copyright: The U.K. Supreme Court Ruling in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth and 
Why Congress Should Follow Suit, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 87, 102–03 (2012) (analyzing the 2012 
U.K. Supreme Court’s ruling in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth to show the court’s acceptance of the 
idea that a domestic court should not preside over a claim originating from actions in a foreign 
country). 
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benefit from governing the contract—a question of particular importance 
with respect to developing countries like Kenya.176 
As an example of how Kenya could benefit from hosting disputes, 
Kenya has existing laws that recognize intellectual property rights and ad-
here to the mandatory TRIPS provisions.177 Kenya, however, still struggles 
with political corruption in enforcing these laws.178 The court system is not 
immune from the widespread bribery and exploitation the country struggles 
to control.179 Corruption and knock-off goods will force engineers to con-
sider the long-term economic viability of their product because these factors 
are economic barriers that are not as prevalent in developed nations.180 
Moreover, if their product suffers from counterfeiting or illegal reproduc-
tion, a widespread practice in Kenya, choosing to resolve the dispute 
through the Kenyan courts will likely lead to few positive outcomes.181 
Kenya’s economy will feel the positive impact of regulated goods entering 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(2)(a) (presenting an ideal standard for applying a choice-of-law provision without referenc-
ing developing nations in need of technology necessary to develop). 
 177 E.g., Official Secrets Act (2016) Cap. 187 (Kenya) (detailing trade secret standards in 
Kenya); Copyright Act, 2001 (2014) Cap. 130 §§ 22–34 (Kenya) (setting the standard for copy-
right protection in Kenya); Trade Marks Act (2012) Cap. 506 §§ 4–19 (Kenya) (outlining re-
quirements for trademark infringement in Kenya); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40 
(binding all member states of the WTO to comply with TRIPS). 
 178 See, e.g., Maya Gainer, How Kenya Cleaned Up Its Courts, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 9, 
2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/09/how-kenya-cleaned-up-its-courts [https://perma.cc/
3WW5-WB63] (noting that corruption exists in forty-three percent of Kenyan cases). 
 179 Nancy Agutu, Policy, Lands Ministry, and Judiciary Most Corrupt in Kenya—Bribery 
Index, THE STAR, KENYA (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/08/31/police-
lands-ministry-and-judiciary-most-corrupt-in-kenya-bribery_c1627065 [https://perma.cc/WD7J-
2L2R] (reporting that almost fifty percent of all judicial proceedings have some sort of judicial 
extortion). A common maxim in Kenya asks, “Why hire a lawyer when you can buy a judge?” 
Gainer, supra note 178. This Note assumes that engineers will act ethically and not engage in 
bribery or pay-off schemes. See Humanitarian Engineering, supra note 16 (defining humanitarian 
engineering to include individuals who want to positively develop an impoverished community). 
 180 Conceição Castro & Pedro Nunes, Does Corruption Inhibit Foreign Direct Investment?, 
51 POLÍTICA REVISTA DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA, Jan.–July 2013, at 61, 76 (Chile) (demonstrating a 
negative correlation between corruption and foreign direct investment); Carsten Fink et al., The 
Economic Effects of Counterfeiting and Piracy: A Review and Implications for Developing Coun-
tries, 31 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER, Feb. 2016, at 1, 2 (finding that increases in violations of 
intellectual property rights hinders economic growth). 
 181 See Fredrick Oduol Oduor, The Internet and Copyright Protection: Are We Producing a 
Global Generation of Copyright Criminals?, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 513–14 (2011) 
(commenting on the rampant software copyright infringement in Kenya). For example, fraudulent 
software costs companies operating in Kenya a cumulative loss of about 12.8 billion Kenyan Shil-
lings, approximately $125 million USD, due to a lack of enforcement against piracy in the country as 
of 2016. Brian Ngugi, Software Piracy in Kenya Costs Firms Sh12.8bn, BUS. DAILY (Apr. 6, 2016), 
https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/Software-piracy-in-Kenya-costs-firms-Sh12-8bn/
539550-3149112-9jxk3az/index.html [https://perma.cc/5WR8-MTSF] (analyzing the economic 
effect of software piracy in Kenya). Approximately seventy-eight percent of all software in Kenya 
originates from illegal operations. Id. 
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the market, but requiring engineers to choose Kenyan law based on the 
characteristic test will jeopardize the engineers’ chance of profiting from 
their design.182 If international law adopts the characteristic test for venue 
selection, the problems with the Kenyan legal system will deter investment, 
hinder technology trade, and ultimately diminish Kenya’s capacity to devel-
op because fewer engineers will invest in the country.183 
Even if governmental reform can create more predictable results in the 
Kenyan judiciary, a lack of resources within the legal system will hinder ac-
cess to the courts.184 Within the courts, the dramatic backlog of active cases 
and a lack of current technology delays the settlement of cases.185 As a result, 
a lawsuit filed in Kenya takes a significant amount of time to resolve.186 Ad-
ditionally, because of the slower court process, the opposing party may con-
tinue to disregard their contractual obligations.187 This timeframe increases 
given the physical inaccessibility of Kenyan courts.188 The distant courts with 
outdated technology provide few incentives for Kenyans to travel to court-
houses and lose precious work time.189 The difficult legal process may de-
crease an engineer’s desire to transfer technology to Kenya, as the engineer 
                                                                                                                           
 182 See Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (suggesting that developed and developing coun-
tries have a mutual, symbiotic role in international development and technology transfer); Chris 
Rojek, Counterfeit Commerce: Relations of Production, Distribution and Exchange, CULTURAL 
SOC., June 2016, at 28, 29, 33 (commenting that illegal goods constitute five to seven percent of 
international trade with developing countries feeling the largest negative impact from these 
goods). 
 183 See Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (stating that technology transfer must occur to 
relieve poverty in developing countries); Fink et al., supra note 180, at 2 (noting that significant 
occurrences of intellectual property rights violations result in poor economic conditions because 
high counterfeiting rates lead to decreases in innovation and corporate investment). 
 184 See Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 153–54 (explaining how Kenya, unlike some other de-
veloping countries, has not updated its case management system and the lack of a small claims 
system unnecessarily clumps all proceedings together to create a significant buildup of active 
disputes). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 153. 
 187 See In re Estate of M’Rutere M’Munyange (2011) eKLR (HC) 3 (Kenya) (upholding the 
standard for a preliminary injunction and further noting that the court only sparingly grants pre-
liminary injunction motions). If the plaintiff in a suit cannot receive a preliminary injunction, or 
even a hearing for a preliminary injunction, then the defendant can continue the offending activity, 
regardless of the impact on the plaintiff. Injunction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining injunction); see, e.g., In re Estate of M’Rutere M’Munyange (2011) eKLR (HC) 3 (Ken-
ya) (granting a motion for preliminary injunction because the plaintiff successfully showed that 
the potential harm exceeds monetary damages). 
 188 See Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 153 (noting that many individuals view the Kenyan 
courts as inaccessible due to the time needed to access them); Aparna Polavarapu, Expanding 
Standing to Develop Democracy: Third-Party Public Interest Standing as a Tool for Emerging 
Democracies, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 105, 132–33 (2016) (highlighting the vast distance separating 
non-urban communities and physical court buildings). 
 189 See Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 156 (reporting that almost three-quarters of surveyed 
Kenyans find the judicial system ineffective at providing adequate assistance). 
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will have too high a risk of exploitation without comprehensive remedies.190 
Selecting Kenyan courts in a choice-of-law clause will deter an engineer and, 
in turn, negatively influence Kenya’s right to development.191 Though Ken-
yan courts present significant uncertainties and hardships, choosing Kenyan 
law may provide powerful motivation for humanitarian engineers: allowing 
Kenya to develop on its own terms.192 
Litigating disputes arising from choice-of-law clauses in Kenya will 
force the country to modernize and adapt its judicial proceedings.193 In ad-
dition, challenges to technology transfer agreements will provide Kenya the 
opportunity to shape intellectual property rights to adhere to the country’s 
view of property.194 Textually, Kenya adheres to the provisions set forth in 
agreements such as TRIPS.195 Adjudicating Kenya’s laws in Kenya will al-
low the country to determine what the treaties mean in the Kenyan con-
text.196 
This provides a long-term incentive for engineers to litigate in Kenya 
and develop a body of predictable Kenyan intellectual property law.197 By 
                                                                                                                           
 190 See André O. Laplume et al., The Politics of Intellectual Property Rights Regimes: An 
Empirical Study of New Technology Use in Entrepreneurship, TECHNOVATION, Dec. 2014, at 807, 
815 (2014) (correlating the access to democracy in a country to the amount of investment in that 
region). 
 191 See id. (commenting on the necessity of democracy to obtain financial investments); Lid-
gard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (suggesting a need to transfer technology to curb human rights 
abuses); Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 153 (noting individuals’ dissatisfaction with the Kenyan 
judiciary due to ineffective administration and unnecessary physical distance to courts). 
 192 Cf. Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1141, 1163 (2006) (reviewing LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPE-
TITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005)) (explaining that aca-
demics believe that Delaware gained a favorable national reputation in bankruptcy proceedings 
because of the court’s background, knowledge, and skill). But cf. Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, 
Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 292 (2016) (arguing that Delaware’s race to attract bank-
ruptcy cases created a system of poor legal standards). 
 193 Cf. Zywicki, supra note 192, at 1163 (describing the process that gave Delaware a special-
ized-but-respected bankruptcy system). 
 194 See Sudi, supra note 119 (questioning whether Kenya’s new constitution will positively 
impact the role of intellectual property protection in the country); see also Nzomo, supra note 119 
(noting how the 2010 Kenyan constitution denotes the first time a Kenyan constitution included 
intellectual property rights). 
 195 See, e.g., Official Secrets Act (2016) Cap. 187 (Kenya) (establishing Kenyan trade secret 
laws); Copyright Act, 2001 (2014) Cap. 130 §§ 22–34 (Kenya) (stating Kenya’s copyright protec-
tions); Trade Marks Act (2012) Cap. 506 §§ 4–19 (Kenya) (providing the standards for trademark 
regulation in Kenya); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, arts. 65–66 (mandating adher-
ence to the provisions of TRIPS). 
 196 Cf. Zywicki, supra note 192, at 1163 (illustrating how a court system can gain a competi-
tive advantage by becoming the first jurisdiction to interpret laws, thus using their first-impression 
rulings to develop disputes in a manner beneficial for both state policy and legal precedent). 
 197 Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate Govern-
ance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 740–41 (2013) (showing how factors such as high judicial competen-
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litigating in Kenya, engineers from all countries must adhere to provisions 
determined by only one jurisdiction.198 Instead of returning to their home 
countries during disputes, engineers will have to negotiate agreements that 
positively develop Kenya’s legal system and, in turn, technology access.199 
The initial proceedings will likely result in unnecessary delays and loss-
es.200 As the system adjudicates more cases, though, predictability and clari-
ty will arise.201 The development of Kenyan law will create increased cer-
tainty for humanitarian engineers because every technology transfer to 
Kenya will abide by the same set of laws.202 By choosing Kenyan law, en-
gineers will build a more sustainable system for technology transfer agree-
ments.203 
Overall, even if the characteristic test favors choosing Kenyan law, engi-
neers will need to consider negative factors such as corruption and accessibil-
ity.204 If they choose Kenyan law, however, they may have the opportunity to 
develop a system of law that allows Kenya to dictate how it wants to devel-
op.205 
                                                                                                                           
cy, reactive legislation, and academic foresight created a strong litigant preference for a single juris-
diction). 
 198 Cf. Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litiga-
tion, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1100 (2013) (showing how Delaware has gained a dominance in 
American corporate law through litigants’ continual preference to try cases in that jurisdiction). 
But cf. Stephen Kiebzak et al., The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on 
Entrepreneurial Activity, RES. POL’Y, Feb. 2016, at 218, 230 (finding that as the number of patent 
challenges in a jurisdiction increases, the amount of investment in the area decreases). 
 199 See Nzomo, supra note 119 (explaining how Kenya’s new constitution will allow for 
unique development in the country’s intellectual property rights). 
 200 See Ouko et al., supra note 119, at 156 (listing Kenyan courts’ physical limitations); Agu-
tu, supra note 179 (explaining corruption in Kenya’s judiciary). 
 201 Cf. Sara Lewis, Note, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem into the “No-
where but Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 199 (2008) (noting a trend of 
plaintiffs wanting to avoid the Delaware corporate court due to the efficient and determinable case 
outcomes). 
 202 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(2)(a). But cf. Lewis, supra note 201, at 199 (showing how over-certainty in Delaware has 
caused plaintiffs to avoid the state’s jurisdiction). 
 203 Cf. Fisch, supra note 197, 740–41 (discussing how Delaware has embraced its role as a 
leader in corporate law by adapting both its judicial and legislative systems); Sudi, supra note 119 
(noting the potential future of Kenya’s intellectual property regulations). 
 204 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 27, at 7 (noting Kenya’s high rate of corruption); 
Torremans, supra note 122, at 27 (outlining the many factors a court must consider when deter-
mining the applicable law for a technology transfer agreement); Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 156 
(commenting on Kenyans’ discontent with the physical inaccessibility of Kenya’s courts). 
 205 See Nzomo, supra note 119 (explaining how Kenya’s 2010 constitution noted a shift in 
Kenya’s view of intellectual property because the new constitution included intellectual property 
as a means to protect culture, a first for the country); see, e.g., Fisch, supra note 197, at 740–41 
(2013) (explaining the power that the quick adaptation of law can have on a jurisdiction, as seen 
through the dominance of Delaware). 
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B. Why Engineers Cannot Justify Selecting Their Jurisdiction to Control 
Despite the Drawbacks of Relying on Kenyan Law 
Allowing Kenyan courts to preside over contract disputes arising from 
technology transfer agreements may benefit the country’s development but 
could also deter engineers from placing products in the country.206 Taking 
the chance on Kenyan law may impose too great a burden on engineers.207 
The characteristic test addresses this concern.208 The test favors the trans-
feree’s jurisdiction when the transferee experiences the greater burden.209 If, 
however, the contract places a greater weight on the transferor, then the test 
recommends applying the law of the transferor’s location.210 For the engi-
neer, this means access to updated courts and a well-developed system of 
law.211 Engineers must, however, balance certainty and accessibility against 
forcing a foreign philosophy on Kenya.212 Because of the potential for long-
lasting, negative effects on Kenya’s right to development, engineers should 
only select their country’s law when the convenience of their law outweighs 
the burden on Kenya.213 This section explores the two main benefits of 
choosing a developed country’s law: the ability to avoid the institutional bar-
riers in Kenya and the option to create uniform licensing agreements for 
transfers in multiple countries.214 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (commenting on developed countries’ potential to 
alleviate economic hardship in developing countries); Sudi, supra note 119 (questioning whether 
Kenyan’s constitutional inclusion of intellectual property will benefit Kenya); supra notes 173–
205 and accompanying text (discussing the potential benefits of Kenyan law controlling technolo-
gy transfer agreements). 
 207 See Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 156 (explaining the lack of resources in Kenyan courts); 
Laplume et al., supra note 190, at 815 (concluding that when high levels of corruption exist in a 
country, the country becomes less likely to adapt innovative technologies). 
 208 PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(2)(b). 
 209 Id. art. 3:502(2)(a); supra notes 173–205 and accompanying text. 
 210 PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(2)(b); see Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (detailing situations in which the default law 
should be that of the transferor’s location’s jurisdiction). 
 211 Cf. Zywicki, supra note 192, at 1163 (commenting on how Delaware has gained specific 
competence in bankruptcy proceedings due to the large number of cases filed in the jurisdiction). 
But see Klerman & Reilly, supra note 192, at 292 (reasoning that Delaware’s race to be the first 
jurisdiction to rule on a matter has resulted in prematurely decided law). 
 212 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (noting the necessity to select the transferor’s loca-
tion when the contract concerns multiple jurisdictions); Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (ad-
vocating for the transfer of technology); Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 153 (noting the physical 
inaccessibility of Kenyan courts). 
 213 See Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (suggesting that developed countries have an 
obligation to transfer technology to developing countries); Ocheni & Nwankwo, supra note 55, at 
47, 51 (highlighting how the British reshaped Kenya’s education system to become dependent on 
foreign nations). 
 214 See infra notes 215–231 and accompanying text. 
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First, by using the laws of the developed country, contracting parties 
can avoid much of the corruption in Kenya.215 For example, three of the top 
four patent-producing countries, according to the Corruption Perceptions 
Index, have corruption scores of seventy-four, seventy-two, and fifty-three 
out of one hundred.216 Compared to Kenya, with its score of twenty-six, 
developed countries are much less likely to experience corruption.217 In ad-
dition, the Kenyan court system lacks the technology needed for complex, 
multinational litigation.218 By utilizing the legal standards and court tech-
nology of developed countries, both parties can access legal precedent re-
gardless of location.219 These factors, overall, allow for a higher likelihood 
of a fair judicial proceeding.220 
Even if transferees can clear the accessibility hurdle, they must also 
understand the law.221 A Kenyan lawyer will have a distinct disadvantage 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 27, at 6–7 (assessing the United States as seventy-
four and Kenya a twenty-six out of one hundred for political corruption); see Gainer, supra note 
178 (detailing judicial corruption in Kenya). Transparency International determines the Corruption 
Perceptions Index ranking based on an annual compilation of expert analyses. TRANSPARENCY 
INT’L, supra note 204, at 1. 
 216 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 27, at 6. The countries, the United States, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea, rank 18th, 20th, and 52nd of 176, respectively. Id. This Note does not 
include the fourth country, China, because, although it has one of the world’s largest economies, 
the World Bank still considers China a developing nation. The World Bank in China, WORLD 
BANK (Sept. 26, 2018), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview [https://perma.cc/
Y5G3-F5BE]; see also TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 27, at 6 (rating China as 79th on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index with a score of forty). 
 217 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 27, at 7 (listing the corruption index score for de-
veloped countries and Kenya). 
 218 See WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN JUSTICE REFORM 1992–2012, at 21–22 (2012) (report-
ing on two World Bank projects aimed at improving Kenya’s judicial system through financing 
technological upgrades); Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 156 (explaining how Kenya’s limited adop-
tion of technology in the judicial system has prolonged cases). 
 219 See Leesi Ebenezer Mitee, The Right of Public Access to Legal Information, 18 GER. L.J. 
1429, 1434, 1436 (2017) (claiming that many developing countries do not have access to legal 
documents due to a lack of motivation on the part of their governments rather than a lack of avail-
able technology); Kevin P. Brady & Justin M. Bathon, Education Law in a Digital Age: The 
Growing Impact of the Open Access Legal Movement, 277 ED. LAW. REP. 589, 590 (2012) (show-
ing that ninety-six percent of American legal researchers use internet-based databases). Dr. Brady 
continues to argue that, through the open source movement, the cost of legal research has de-
clined, which has allowed for increased global access. Brady & Bathon, supra, at 591. Mitee, 
however, shows that in the United States, many government entities charge large amounts of mon-
ey to access official documents, placing limitations on access to information similar to those faced 
by attorneys in developing countries. Mitee, supra, at 1436. 
 220 See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 27, at 6–7 (ranking the United States as significant-
ly less corrupt than Kenya); Brady & Bathon, supra note 219, at 591 (showing how technological 
advancements increase access to legal precedent). 
 221 See Mitee, supra note 219, at 1436 (explaining how the costly fees necessary to access 
American law and regulations prohibit significant public access); Richard A. Posner, Legal Re-
search and Practical Experience, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 239, 239, 243 (2017) (commenting on how 
an understanding of law comes through practice rather than pure research). But see Brady & Ba-
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when challenging a developed-country attorney due to a lack of experience 
in that country’s law and legal-research infrastructure.222 Because of this 
lack of experience, the selection of a transferor’s country as the proper legal 
forum benefits the engineer but may harm long-term development in Ken-
ya.223 
Second, if an engineer creates a product and places the device in mul-
tiple countries, the engineer will likely want a uniform contract.224 Instead 
of each contract adhering to a different set of laws in different jurisdictions 
with different government structures, stipulating the licensor’s location will 
allow for easier transactions.225 Not only does this decrease long-term costs, 
but it also increases the engineer’s ability to transfer the technology to mul-
tiple communities.226 Because the engineer only needs to produce a single 
contract, the engineer can transfer a product with little work required to 
maintain compliance.227 
As a trade-off, by stipulating their home jurisdiction to govern tech-
nology transfer agreements, engineers will take away Kenya’s ability to 
choose how it wants to develop its understanding of intellectual property.228 
Adhering to a developed country’s standard may ease the burden on the en-
gineer, but will also indirectly force Kenya to adhere to the intellectual 
property rights of the developed country.229 This means Kenya will have no 
direct power over the contracts related to intellectual property.230 Instead of 
                                                                                                                           
thon, supra note 219, at 591–92 (commenting on how more American legal information has be-
come accessible online without any paywall). 
 222 See Deborah J. Cantrell & Kenneth Sharpe, Practicing Practical Wisdom, 67 MERCER L. 
REV. 331, 345 (2016) (acknowledging that the sole way to gain practical knowledge comes 
through direct exposure); Posner, supra note 221, at 239, 243 (addressing the author’s experience 
that the best means to understand the law comes through experience). 
 223 See Cantrell & Sharpe, supra note 222, at 345 (arguing that expertise can only develop 
through direct practice); Posner, supra note 221, at 243 (noting that expertise in the practice and 
reshaping of law best results from practice in that area). 
 224 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (explaining the difficulty in selecting a jurisdiction 
in international intellectual property agreements); Picht, supra note 137, at 463 (advocating for 
parties to choose a governing law that allows for the highest amount of simplicity and clarity). 
 225 Torremans, supra note 122, at 35. 
 226 See id. (noting that one contract cannot adhere to standards set by multiple jurisdictions). 
 227 See id. (commenting on the difficulty of multinational contracts). 
 228 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(2)(b) (placing the transferor’s location as superior to the transferee’s location because of the 
encumbrances placed on the transferor); supra notes 192–205 and accompanying text (explaining 
why Kenyan law should control technology transfer agreements). 
 229 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (noting the impossibility of one contract adhering to 
multiple jurisdiction’s laws); see also PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 3:502(2)(b) (taking the power away from the transferee’s location 
by suggesting the transferor’s location should control the governing law). 
 230 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (arguing for the transferor’s location to determine 
relevant authority). But see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, arts. 65–66 (enforcing a minimum 
standard that all member states of the WTO must meet). Kenya does, however, still have some 
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controlling intellectual property within its borders, Kenya will have to 
watch as the developed world redefines Kenya’s historical, communal un-
derstanding of property.231 
C. How Focusing on Africa’s Regional Economic Communities Can  
Solve a Humanitarian Engineer’s Dilemma 
Even though placing technology in multiple countries while licensing 
it under the law of the engineer’s country benefits the engineer and harms 
Kenya, the engineer can mitigate the negative effects of this jurisdiction 
selection by looking towards regional economic organizations that include 
Kenya.232 Individual countries dictate the intellectual property rights within 
their borders, but the regional economic communities provide guidance on 
best practices.233 The African Union, which includes Kenya, formally rec-
ognizes four regional economic communities in which Kenya partici-
pates.234 The communities provide for the flow of technology, resources, 
                                                                                                                           
power due to its membership in the WTO. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, arts. 65–66 (allow-
ing signatory parties to set an international standard for intellectual property). Though Kenya does 
not have the ability to dictate a developed country’s intellectual property standard, it has already 
agreed to a minimum standard legally enforceable through the WTO. Id. 
 231 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (suggesting that contracting parties select the juris-
diction of the transferor’s location to control the agreement’s terms); see, e.g., Nzomo, supra note 
119 (commenting on the importance of the inclusion of intellectual property rights in the new 
Kenyan constitution). 
 232 See, e.g., Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community art. 103(1)(i), Nov. 30, 
1997, 2144 U.N.T.S. 255 (creating the East African Community (“EAC”) that focuses on creating an 
economic and political coalition between Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania); Agreement on the Creation 
of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization art III, Dec. 9, 1976, (available at http://
www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/ap001/trt_ap001_001en.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VED-UR5K]) 
(establishing the ideals of the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization to form a continen-
tal body focused on universalizing the intellectual property standards within Africa). The African 
Union, formed in 2000, seeks to establish a continent-wide system focused on harmonizing the laws 
and promoting the advancement and development of Africa. Constitutive Act of the African Union 
art. 3, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 (entering into force Apr. 27, 2001); Corinne A.A. Packer & 
Donald Rukare, The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 372 (2002) 
(summarizing the goals and purpose of the African Union). 
 233 See, e.g., COMMON MKT. FOR E. & S. AFR., COMESA POLICY ON INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS passim (2013) (stating the views of intellectual property held by the Common Mar-
ket for Eastern and Southern Africa’s (“COMESA”)); E. AFR. CMTY., REGIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY POLICY ON THE UTILISATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH-RELATED WTO-TRIPS FLEXIBILI-
TIES AND THE APPROXIMATION OF NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION 11 (2013) 
(stating that the overall objective of the report is to assist member states in developing their intel-
lectual property laws). 
 234 Regional Economic Communities (RECs), AFR. UNION, https://au.int/en/organs/recs [https://
perma.cc/TG8E-SPG8] (listing the formally recognized regional economic communities in Africa 
and their purposes); see, e.g., Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, supra 
note 232, art. 103(1)(i) (forming the East African Community). This structure has created a three-
level governance system: the African Union overseeing the regional economic communities, 
which overlook member states. Craig Jackson, Constitutional Structure and Governance Strate-
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and goods between signatory parties.235 Though the organizations do not 
mandate member states’ intellectual property laws, the charters and regula-
tions can provide insight into the values of member states.236 Following the 
policies established by these economic alliances allows engineers to create 
generic licensing agreements based off of a developed country’s law while 
simultaneously allowing Kenya to retain some control over intellectual prop-
erty regulations in the county.237 Adhering to these policies lowers transaction 
costs because parties will not need to negotiate individual contracts for each 
country and, in turn, will support Kenya’s right to develop by encouraging 
more technology transfer agreements.238 The insights provided by the eco-
nomic communities decrease the potential for engineers to repeat the harmful 
consequences experienced when uninformed engineers place technologies 
into countries in the hopes of facilitating development.239 
III. WHY KENYAN LAW SHOULD CONTROL UNLESS AN ENGINEER 
PRESENTS A STRONG SHOWING OF HARMS THEY WOULD EXPERIENCE 
Humanitarian engineers have many options when deciding choice-of-
law: they may elect to use the laws of their jurisdiction, the laws of the place 
                                                                                                                           
gies for Economic Integration in Africa and Europe, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 
154 (2003); Regional Economic Communities (RECs), supra (detailing the African Union’s gov-
ernance structure). 
 235 See, e.g., COMESA Social Charter arts. II, III, Feb. 24, 2014, (available at http://
programmes.comesa.int/attachments/article/82/Comesa%20Social%20Charter%20Final%20-%20
ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/49RR-DWRA]); Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) arts. 3(a), 13A(n), Mar. 21, 1996, IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc 
(stating a motivation of increasing access to technology throughout the economic region). 
 236 See, e.g., COMMON MKT. FOR E. & S. AFR., supra note 233, paras. 15–20 (requiring mem-
ber states of the COMESA to assist in the transfer of intellectual property within the economic 
region); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, pmbl. (providing background to the enactment 
of TRIPS). 
 237 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (detailing when the transferor’s location should 
control an international technology transfer agreement). Compare COMMON MKT. FOR E. & S. 
AFR., supra note 233, passim (detailing COMESA’s position on intellectual property rights), with 
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Community Common Market art. 43, Nov. 20, 
2009, (the Protocol is available at http://eacj.org//wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Common-Market-
Protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G6N-3RLL]) (outlining the EAC’s position on the promotion of 
intellectual property between member states). 
 238 See Laplume et al., supra note 190, at 815 (establishing a negative correlation between a 
region’s amount of corruption and international investment); see also PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT 
OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, pmbl. (stating a desire to decrease the 
confusion surrounding technology transfer agreements by increasing the certainty in contracting). 
 239 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 55, at 91–92 (illustrating how technologies such as railroads 
and telegraphs allowed colonists to maintain power); Ocheni & Nwankwo, supra note 55, at 47, 
51 (showing how colonialists used education and technology to reshape the colonies’ independent 
economies). 
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where their products will go, or any stipulated standard.240 Because of the 
jurisdictional restrictions of intellectual property, however, technology trans-
fer agreements limit the options to either the location of the transferor or the 
location of the transferee.241 The choice of law will depend on whether the 
engineer wants to transfer technology into one or more than one country.242 If 
the engineer only places the product in Kenya, the engineer must prioritize 
Kenyan law instead of favoring their own jurisdiction as current law per-
mits.243 In situations where the engineer will transfer the technology to Kenya 
and another region, however, the engineer should select their own law as long 
as it does not conflict with a recognized regional economic community’s pol-
icies.244 Section A proposes an analysis for when Kenyan law should con-
trol.245 Section B then recommends a course of action for unique circum-
stances when an engineer can stipulate that a developed country’s laws should 
govern.246 Section C suggests that organizations and institutions focused on 
humanitarian engineering should enforce this policy.247 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:501 (allowing parties to select a governing jurisdiction); see also Rome Convention, supra note 
135, art. 3(1) (stipulating a freedom-of-choice with regards to selecting the governing law); 
U.C.C. § 1-301 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (providing parties with the ability to 
select the governing law). 
 241 See NGUYEN, supra note 22, at 25 (explaining how technology transfer agreements rest on 
assuming that adequate intellectual property protections exist in both jurisdictions); Torremans, 
supra note 122, at 34 (stating that intellectual property transfer agreements only occur when the 
jurisdiction recognizes the intellectual property rights at issue). But see Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853 (forcing all 
signatory countries to respect copyrights protected in the jurisdiction the work originated in). 
 242 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502; Torremans, supra note 122, at 34–35 (explaining factors relevant when selecting a control-
ling jurisdiction). 
 243 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(a) (advocating for the transferee’s location to govern the contract due to the burden placed 
on the singular jurisdiction receiving the technology); supra notes 192–205 and accompanying 
text (commenting on the long-term benefit of prioritizing Kenyan law); infra notes 248–267 and 
accompanying text (arguing for humanitarian engineers to adhere to Kenyan law in technology 
transfer agreements). 
 244 See PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 
3:502(b) (providing factors that favor selecting a transferor’s location as the controlling jurisdic-
tion); infra notes 268–280 and accompanying text (stating the role of regional economic commu-
nities in forming national intellectual property policies). 
 245 See infra notes 248–267 and accompanying text. 
 246 See infra notes 268–280 and accompanying text. 
 247 See infra notes 281–293 and accompanying text. 
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A. An Engineer Has a Duty to Select Kenya When the Technology  
Transfer Only Concerns Kenya 
Choosing the law of a developed country permits an engineer to rely 
solely on that country’s law without the burden of a complex, multijurisdic-
tional agreement.248 This choice, however, has too many negative conse-
quences for Kenya.249 For a designer focused on humanitarian engineering, 
these harms must be considered.250 An engineer cannot profit from activity 
in a developing country without considering the potential impacts on that 
country.251 
The idea of property, both physical and intellectual, is strongly tied to 
Kenya’s philosophy of community and national identity.252 Kenya has his-
torically relied on a communal idea of intellectual property.253 Without this 
philosophy, many small and rural villages would not survive because 
knowledge related to agriculture and medicine would no longer be readily 
accessible.254 The communal view of intellectual property began to change 
when the British occupied the country and mandated a new judicial sys-
tem.255 Kenya no longer controlled its laws but instead had to follow legal 
structures that conflicted with its cultural heritage.256 Though Kenya gained 
independence in 1964, the impacts of colonial rule still dominate the re-
                                                                                                                           
 248 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (highlighting the complexity of multinational agree-
ments). 
 249 See, e.g., Ocheni & Nwankwo, supra note 55, at 51 (explaining how colonial powers re-
shaped Kenya’s education and manufacturing systems to benefit developed countries); Cathy 
Mputhia, Intellectual Property Rights in Africa Date Back to Colonial Period, BUS. DAILY (June 
16, 2013), https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Intellectual-property-rights-date-back-to-colonial-
period/539444-1884724-dcar1d/index.html [https://perma.cc/EV3V-FV6G] (noting how colonial 
powers in Kenya empowered European settlers through strict intellectual property laws). 
 250 See Ali, supra note 15, at 13 (explaining how humanitarian engineering relates to commu-
nity development); Ocheni & Nwankwo, supra note 55, at 51 (illustrating how the British reshap-
ing of Kenya’s education and economic systems created a country dependent on the colonial pow-
er). 
 251 See Mattson &Wood, supra note 15, at 1 (showing how product design can negatively 
affect the communities receiving the technology). 
 252 See CONSTITUTION arts. 11(1), 11(2)(e) (2010) (Kenya) (stating the role of intellectual 
property in Kenyan legal policy); see, e.g., COMMON MKT. FOR E. & S. AFR., supra note 233, 
para. 1 (noting how intellectual property can protect many cultural identities). 
 253 See, e.g., Kuruk, supra note 120, at 779 (defining folklore as a specific type of intellectual 
property that includes information and knowledge historically spread throughout a society). 
 254 See id. (showing how communities must pass down traditional knowledge, especially with 
regards to agriculture, to maintain themselves). 
 255 Crowne, supra note 40, at 77; Mputhia, supra note 249. 
 256 Cotran, supra note 109, at 45 (demonstrating how the British established a legal system 
controlled by settlers that furthered the settlers’ personal objectives while forcing compliance on 
locals); Mputhia, supra note 249. 
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gion.257 Intellectual property transformed Kenya by requiring dependence 
on a system that benefited a faraway land.258 
As trade becomes more globalized and the need for technology trans-
fer increases, Kenya has had to reshape its view of property.259 With agree-
ments such as TRIPS and subsequent TRIPS Plus provisions, Kenya has 
lost the ability to define what intellectual property means for the country.260 
Humanitarian engineers seek to help the development of a country, but al-
lowing their contracts to ignore Kenyan law furthers harms created by de-
veloped nations.261 Engineers must recognize this.262 
Because of the potential harm to Kenya that could prolong the impact 
of colonialism, engineers should select Kenya as the governing jurisdiction 
when transferring technology into the country.263 Engineers may face cor-
ruption, fewer legal resources, and increased complexity due to a lack of 
transparency.264 As individuals who devote their careers to furthering Ken-
                                                                                                                           
 257 See, e.g., Ocheni & Nwankwo, supra note 55, at 47, 51 (explaining how the Industrial 
Revolution allowed the British to import new technology into Kenya, create a manufacturing sys-
tem that provided raw material for industrialization, and then leave the country with an economy 
dependent on foreign markets). 
 258 See id. (explaining historical areas of abuse with respect to technology transferred to de-
veloping countries from colonial powers); Crowne, supra note 40, at 79 (detailing how developed 
countries like the United States joined the TRIPS negotiations to hinder developing country’s 
power); Nzomo, supra note 119 (claiming that Kenya’s recent constitution represents a fundamen-
tal change in the country’s relationship with intellectual property). 
 259 Nzomo, supra note 119; see CONSTITUTION arts. 11(1), 11(2)(e) (2010) (Kenya) (stating 
the role and meaning of intellectual property in Kenya). 
 260 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 40, art. 1 (mandating that WIPO member states adhere 
to TRIPS’s provisions); Tran-Wasescha & Groussot, supra note 75, at 19 (detailing the process by 
which a TRIPS signatory can force conformity through WTO proceedings); Turk, supra note 41, 
at 1004 (outlining the process for creating TRIPS Plus agreements). 
 261 See Ali, supra note 15, at 13 (commenting on the academic understanding of humanitarian 
engineering); see, e.g., Ocheni & Nwankwo, supra note 55, at 47, 51 (explaining the long-lasting 
influence of British colonialism on Kenya). As an example of a failed product, PlayPump Interna-
tional created a pumping system in which children spinning on a merry-go-round would pump 
water into a remote tank. Michael Hobbes, Stop Trying to Save the World, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 
17, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120178/problem-international-development-and-plan-
fix-it [https://perma.cc/K47Z-TSQV] (detailing the impact of humanitarian engineering in Africa). 
Though this product showed great promise and the pumps failed to provide a consistent water 
supply, lacked an easily operable system, required significant maintenance, and ignored communi-
ty requests. Ralph Borland, Radical Plumbers and PlayPumps: Objects in Development (2011) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author). 
 262 Mattson & Wood, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
 263 See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 28, art. 10 (stating the right of 
countries to choose how to develop); see, e.g., Ocheni & Nwankwo, supra note 55, at 47, 51 
(showing how British colonialism left Kenya dependent on the empire even after gaining inde-
pendence). 
 264 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 27, at 7; Mitee, supra note 219, at 1434, 1436 (claiming 
that the lack of access to technology in developing countries results from political barriers rather 
than technology availability); Ouko et al., supra note 27, at 156. 
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ya’s growth, however, humanitarian engineers must prioritize Kenya’s right 
to development over their personal profits.265 Choosing Kenya allows for the 
country to finally gain control of its own growth and advancement.266 Doing 
otherwise will destroy Kenya’s ability to access a fundamental human right: 
the right to develop.267 
B. An Engineer Should Only Use a Developed Country’s Law in 
Multijurisdictional Contracts When the Agreement Adheres to the Policies 
of the Regional Economic Communities 
Though extreme harm can result from diverting power from Kenya, 
certain situations present too much complexity to avoid stipulating another 
jurisdiction.268 A humanitarian engineer has the right, and in some cases, the 
duty, to place a product in multiple countries.269 Similarly, an engineer has 
the capacity to benefit multiple countries’ right to development through a 
singular agreement, but a multi-state agreement creates significant hardship 
for contract negotiations.270 A single agreement should not have to comply 
with multiple laws in multiple jurisdictions.271 Instead, engineers should 
                                                                                                                           
 265 See Ali, supra note 15, at 13 (defining a humanitarian engineer’s role and purpose); see, 
e.g., Hobbes, supra note 261 (highlighting the human rights violations that result from not only 
PlayPump but also international development projects in general). 
 266 See Sudi, supra note 119(expressing concern for Kenya’s ability to benefit from the new 
constitution’s inclusion of intellectual property); cf. Fisch, supra note 197, at 740–41 (claiming 
that Delaware’s quick judicial and legislative response to business transactions has reinforced 
Delaware’s dominance over other jurisdictions as a venue for corporate governance disputes). But 
cf. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 192, at 292 (advancing the idea that the quickness with which 
the Delaware courts operate has formed an inefficient system with poor legal standards). 
 267 See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 28, art. 1 (stating that the defini-
tion of human rights includes the right to development); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
supra note 14, pmbl. (defining human rights and pledging an international commitment to protect 
them). 
 268 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (noting that a transferor’s location can control when 
a single contract impacts more than two jurisdictions); see also PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF 
LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, art. 3:502(b) (providing a list of factors fa-
voring the transferor’s location to control an agreement’s governing law). 
 269 See Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (explaining why developed countries should en-
gage in technology transfer with developing countries); Ellison, supra note 1, at 122 (commenting 
on developing countries’ overall approval of technology transfer). 
 270 See Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (noting the potential benefit that developing coun-
tries can receive through technology transfer with developed countries); Torremans, supra note 
122, at 35 (noting how a single contract cannot adhere to the policies of multiple jurisdictions); 
see, e.g., Patrick K. Lewis et al., An Engineering Design Strategy for Reconfigurable Products 
that Support Poverty Alleviation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASME 2010 INTERNATIONAL DESIGN 
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL CONFERENCE & COMPUTERS AND INFORMATION IN ENGINEERING 
CONFERENCE 2 (2010) (proposing a design method that balances economic benefit with poverty 
alleviation). 
 271 Torremans, supra note 122, at 35. 
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allow their countries’ laws to govern.272 Engineers can only select their 
countries’ laws if an agreement’s terms adhere to the policies set forth by 
the regional economic communities.273 These organizations pull together 
the views and opinions of many different countries.274 When placing a 
product in a region, as compared to a single country, an engineer should 
determine which community encompasses the greatest number of coun-
tries.275 Then, the parties should base the terms of the agreement on the ide-
als of the community.276 
This approach balances the burdens of both contracting parties.277 Un-
der this proposed framework, Kenya still has some control because Kenya 
participates in the drafting of the regional community’s resolutions, even 
though dispute resolutions under these agreements would occur in a devel-
oped country.278 By adhering to these provisions, engineers can use their 
location to control contracts with less concern about negatively impacting 
Kenya.279 This proposed system protects Kenya’s right to development, fa-
                                                                                                                           
 272 Id.; see PRINCIPLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 123, 
arts. 3:501–:502 (supporting the choice of governance through the location of the transferor be-
cause of the higher burden the transferor bears). 
 273 See COMMON MKT. FOR E. & S. AFR., supra note 233, passim (detailing the COMESA’s 
beliefs regarding intellectual property, including how it wants member states to adapt their poli-
cies); see, e.g., Hobbes, supra note 261 (explaining how a well-intentioned product led to signifi-
cant, negative impacts on African communities). 
 274 COMMON MKT. FOR E. & S. AFR., supra note 233, passim (expressing the overall intellec-
tual property policy goals for the economic community consisting of Burundi, Comoros, Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Ma-
lawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe); Con-
stitutive Act of the African Union art. 3, 11 July, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 (entering into force Apr. 
27, 2001) (setting forth the objectives and goals for the African Union, an economic coalition of 
the entire African continent); Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, supra 
note 232 (charting the EAC, which includes Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania). 
 275 See Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (explaining the inevitable difficulty in choosing a 
jurisdiction to control a contract dispute when the agreement concerns more than two countries). 
See generally UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMM’N FOR AFR., AFRICA REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
INDEX REPORT 2016 (2016) (presenting an analysis of the successes, drawbacks, and potential 
areas of growth for Africa’s regional economic communities). 
 276 See Wood & Mattson, supra note 19, at 1 (describing how designs typically fail when 
engineers do not consider the cultural impacts of their products and introducing nine common 
errors engineers engage in when designing products); see, e.g., COMMON MKT. FOR E. & S. AFR., 
supra note 233, passim (presenting standards, objections, and beliefs about intellectual property). 
 277 See COMMON MKT. FOR E. & S. AFR., supra note 233, passim (stating COMESA’s view of 
intellectual property); Torremans, supra note 122, at 35 (noting that some agreements require 
selecting the transferor’s jurisdiction). 
 278 E.g., Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, supra note 232, art. 
103(1)(i) (noting Kenya’s involvement in the EAC); Constitutive Act of the African Union, supra 
note 232, art. 3(m) (establishing the African Union, which includes all African countries). 
 279 See Mattson & Wood, supra note 15, at 1–2 (presenting nine principles for humanitarian 
engineers to abide by to mitigate negative effects of products meant for use in developing coun-
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cilitates easier international technology transfer, and provides incentives for 
engineers to design for the developing world.280 
C. Enforcement of This Solution Must Come Through  
Humanitarian Engineering Organizations 
Despite decades of attempts, international organizations have not 
passed any uniform regulations for choice-of-law clauses in technology 
transfer agreements.281 Most proposals fail because of the tensions between 
developing and developed countries.282 Even international arbitrators re-
main inconsistent in their approach to selecting a governing law.283 These 
failures and inconsistencies suggest that organizations and universities that 
focus on humanitarian engineering must enforce a policy that complies with 
this proposal.284 
For example, Engineers Without Borders could implement this stand-
ard by mandating a new requirement for technology transfer contracts.285 In 
2016, the U.S. branch of Engineers Without Borders had 190 active projects 
on five continents that impacted 590,000 people.286 Given the breadth of 
this and similar organizations, humanitarian engineering organizations re-
                                                                                                                           
tries); see, e.g., COMESA POLICY ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 233, passim 
(outlining how member states should develop their intellectual property laws). 
 280 See Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 28, art. 1 (defining the right to 
development); Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (commenting on how technology transfer can 
alleviate the effects of underdevelopment); see also Mattson & Wood, supra note 15, at 2 (provid-
ing a guide for humanitarian engineers to employ to efficiently and effectively design products for 
the developing world). 
 281 See Yu, supra note 76, at 839 (explaining the difference between developing and devel-
oped countries’ interests in creating an international technology transfer agreement standard); see 
also supra notes 126–131 and accompanying text (detailing the history and complexity of interna-
tional standards for technology transfer agreements). 
 282 See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 60, at 70 (noting the history of the U.N.’s Draft Internation-
al Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology where dissent between developing and devel-
oped countries led to the failure to enact the agreement). 
 283 Compare Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
PCA Case No. 2012-12, paras. 585, 588 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) (finding that the PCA did not have 
jurisdiction over a case relating to copyright), with Philip Morris Brands SÀRL v. Oriental Repub-
lic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 236 (July 2, 2013) 
(ruling that ICSID does have jurisdiction over a case regarding copyright). 
 284 See LaPorte et al., supra note 17, at 105 (noting the growth of humanitarian engineering 
organizations and programs); Mission & History, supra note 15 (stating a mission to implement 
engineering practices to assist in the development of extremely impoverished communities). 
 285 See Mission & History, supra note 15 (explaining a need to design for the benefit of de-
veloping nations, thus highlighting a potential need for beneficial technology transfers). 
 286 TIFFANY MARTINDALE, ENG’RS WITHOUT BORDERS USA, 2016 ICP MONITORING RE-
PORT 6, 8 (2017) (describing the statistical impact of Engineers Without Borders’ international 
projects). 
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quiring compliance with this proposal could dramatically impact how tech-
nology transfer agreements handle the choice of law.287 
Engineers Without Borders, however, focuses on non-profit work with 
the primary intent of assisting the development of impoverished areas.288 
The specific focus may leave engineers who seek financial gains from hu-
manitarian designs immune from following the proposed system.289 To curb 
the effects of this gap, universities have the onus to educate their students 
on choice-of-law agreements.290 Programs that focus on including social 
justice and beneficial community development must also educate students 
on the potential effects of selecting the wrong governing law.291 Adding in-
formation in lectures on the impact of choice-of-law will encourage the im-
plementation of this proposal where many international organizations lack 
the capacity to do so.292 By allowing individuals and organizations focused 
on humanitarian engineering to adopt this policy, countries like Kenya can 
start developing at a quicker rate without unnecessary control from devel-
oped countries.293 
CONCLUSION 
The international community has long recognized each country’s right 
to development. The transfer of technology between developed and devel-
oping countries, especially through humanitarian engineers, seeks to pro-
mote this process. The dynamic between developing and developed coun-
                                                                                                                           
 287 See Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (commenting on the role of developing countries 
in technology transfer); Mattson & Wood, supra note 15, at 1 (highlighting the role and influence 
of humanitarian engineers). 
 288 Mission & History, supra note 15. 
 289 See, e.g., Hobbes, supra note 261 (noting the consistent failure of products sold into north-
ern Africa). 
 290 See Ali, supra note 15, at 13 (providing a background and definition of humanitarian engi-
neering); see, e.g. Humanitarian Engineering Minor (HUMENG-MN), OHIO STATE UNIV. (Feb. 
2016), https://engineering.osu.edu/sites/engineering.osu.edu/files/uploads/he_minor.pdf [https://
perma.cc/M2B9-7LKE] (seeking to educate students on the interaction between social justice and 
engineering). 
 291 See Ali, supra note 15, at 13 (showing how academia ties together social awareness, tech-
nical development, and engineering design when educating students on humanitarian engineering 
principles); see, e.g., Hobbes, supra note 261 (showing how the PlayPump resulted in women and 
children spending long hours turning a merry-go-round to pump water for the community). 
 292 See Ali, supra note 15, at 13 (explaining how universities educate students on humanitari-
an engineering); see, e.g., Engineering for Community Development Minor, supra note 17 (stating 
the requirements for an Engineering for Community Development minor at the Colorado School 
of Mines). 
 293 Lidgard et al., supra note 20, at 6–7 (detailing how technology transfer from developed 
countries to developing countries can alleviate significant economic hardships in developing na-
tions); Mattson & Wood, supra note 15, at 1, 2 (showing how engineers can positively impact a 
community when using the authors’ proposed design principles). 
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tries’ views of intellectual property threatens this right. Developed countries 
have forced developing countries to reshape their views of property to ena-
ble developed countries to profit at the expense of developing countries. 
Kenya has fallen victim to these mandates. 
Humanitarian engineers can stop this process. The choice-of-law 
clause in international licensing agreements can place the power to control 
internal development in the hands of Kenya. By choosing the law of a de-
veloped country, an engineer robs a developing country of the opportunity 
to control development. Because of this, Kenyan law must control. When 
engineers place products in Kenya, they have a duty to select Kenyan law. If 
a single agreement allows for transfer in multiple countries, the developed 
country’s law can govern if the contract follows the policies set by regional 
economic communities. Furthermore, international organizations and aca-
demic institutions have an obligation to enforce this policy. By following 
this system, engineers can realize sustainable profits while curbing the dom-
inance of developed countries over the developing world and promoting 
Kenya’s right to development. 
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